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Abstract. For decades, two-player (antagonistic) games on graphs have been a framework of choice
for many important problems in theoretical computer science. A notorious one is controller synthesis,
which can be rephrased through the game-theoretic metaphor as the quest for a winning strategy of
the system in a game against its antagonistic environment. Depending on the specification, optimal
strategies might be simple or quite complex, for example having to use (possibly infinite) memory.
Hence, research strives to understand which settings allow for simple strategies.
In 2005, Gimbert and Zielonka [25] provided a complete characterization of preference relations (a formal
framework to model specifications and game objectives) that admit memoryless optimal strategies
for both players. In the last fifteen years however, practical applications have driven the community
toward games with complex or multiple objectives, where memory — finite or infinite — is almost
always required. Despite much effort, the exact frontiers of the class of preference relations that admit
finite-memory optimal strategies still elude us.
In this work, we establish a complete characterization of preference relations that admit optimal strate-
gies using arena-independent finite memory, generalizing the work of Gimbert and Zielonka to the
finite-memory case. We also prove an equivalent to their celebrated corollary of utmost practical inter-
est: if both players have optimal (arena-independent-)finite-memory strategies in all one-player games,
then it is also the case in all two-player games. Finally, we pinpoint the boundaries of our results
with regard to the literature: our work completely covers the case of arena-independent memory (e.g.,
multiple parity objectives, lower- and upper-bounded energy objectives), and paves the way to the
arena-dependent case (e.g., multiple lower-bounded energy objectives).
1 Introduction
Controller synthesis through the game-theoretic metaphor. Two-player games on (finite) graphs
are studied extensively, in particular for their application to controller synthesis for reactive systems (see,
e.g., [26,33,6,2]). The seminal model is antagonistic (i.e., zero-sum if one chooses a quantitative view): player 1
(P1) is seen as the system to control, player 2 (P2) as its antagonistic environment, and the game models
their interaction. Each vertex of the game graph (called arena) models a state of the system and belongs to
one of the players. Players take turns moving a pebble from state to state according to the edges, each player
choosing the destination whenever the pebble is on one of his states. These choices are made according to the
strategy of the player, which, in general, might use memory (bounded or not) of the past moves to prescribe
the next action.
The resulting infinite sequence of states, called play, represents the execution of the system. The objective
of P1 is to enforce a given specification, often encoded as a winning condition (i.e., a set of winning plays)
or as a payoff function to maximize (i.e., a quantitative performance to optimize). This paradigm focuses on
the worst-case performance of the system, hence P2’s goal is to prevent P1 from achieving his objective.
The goal of synthesis is thus to decide if P1 has a winning strategy, i.e., one ensuring a given winning
condition or guaranteeing a given payoff threshold, against all possible strategies of P2, and to build such a
strategy efficiently if it exists.
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Winning strategies are essentially formal blueprints for controllers to implement in practical applications.
Therefore, the complexity of these strategies is of tremendous importance: the simpler the strategy, the
easier and cheaper it will be to build the corresponding controller and maintain it. This explains why a lot of
research effort is constantly put in identifying the exact complexity (in terms of memory and/or randomness)
of strategies needed to play optimally (i.e., to the best of the player’s ability) for each specific class of games
and objectives (e.g., [25,16,13,38,21,9,1,4,37,5,10]). Alongside the practical interest of this question lies the
theoretical puzzle: understanding the underlying mechanisms and implicit properties of games that lead to
“simple” strategies being sufficient. Given the numerous connections between two-player games and various
branches of mathematics and computer science, this endeavor is undoubtedly of high interest.
Preference relations. As hinted above, there are two prominent ways to formalize a game objective in the
literature. The first one, dubbed quantitative and inspired by games in economics, is to use payoff functions
mapping plays to numerical values, and to see P1 as a maximizer player. This is for example the case of
mean-payoff games [18]. The second one, called qualitative, is to define a set of winning plays — called
winning condition — induced by some property, as in, e.g., parity games [19,39]. The two formalisms are
strongly linked: the classical decision problem for quantitative games is to fix a payoff threshold and ask if
P1 has a strategy to guarantee it, essentially transforming the problem into a qualitative one (where the
winning plays are all those achieving a payoff at least equal to the threshold). To define payoff functions or
winning conditions, one often uses weights, priorities, colors, etc, on states or edges of the arena.
In this work, we walk in the footsteps of Gimbert and Zielonka [25]: we associate a color to each edge
of our arenas, and we adopt the abstract formalism of preference relations over infinite sequences of colors
(induced by plays). This general formalism permits to encode virtually all classical game objectives, both
qualitative and quantitative, and lets us reason in a well-founded framework under minimal assumptions.
See Example 3 for illustrations of classical objectives encoded as preference relations.
Memoryless optimal strategies. Remarkably, several canonical classes of games that have been around
for decades and proved their usefulness over and over — e.g., mean-payoff [18], parity [19,39], or energy
games [11] — share a desirable property: they all admit memoryless optimal strategies for both players. That
is, for every strategy σi of Pi, there is a strategy σMLi which is at least as good (i.e., wins whenever σi wins or
ensures at least the same payoff) and that uses no memory at all. Such a memoryless strategy always picks
the same edge when in the same state, regardless of what happened before in the game.
Memoryless strategies are the simplest kind of strategies one can use in a turn-based game on a graph.
Therefore, it is quite interesting that they suffice for objectives as rich as the ones we just discussed. Following
this observation, a lot of effort has been put in understanding which games admit memoryless optimal strate-
gies, and in identifying the exact frontiers of memoryless determinacy. Let us mention, non-exhaustively,
works by Gimbert and Zielonka [24,25] (culminating in a complete characterization), Aminof and Rubin [1]
(through the prism of first-cycle games), and Kopczynski [30] (half-positional determinacy). All these ad-
vances were built by identifying the common underlying mechanisms in ad hoc proofs for specific classes of
games, and generalizing them to wide classes (e.g., the first-cycle games of Aminof and Rubin are inspired
by the seminal paper of Ehrenfeucht and Mycielski on mean-payoff games [18]).
Gimbert and Zielonka’s approach. Arguably, the most important result in this direction is the complete
characterization of preference relations admitting memoryless optimal strategies, established in [25], fifteen
years ago. By complete characterization, we mean sufficient and necessary conditions on the preference
relations.
This result can be stated as follows: a preference relation admits memoryless optimal strategies for both
players on all arenas if and only if the relation (used by P1) and its inverse (used by P2) are monotone and
selective. These concepts will be defined formally in Section 3.1, but let us give an intuition here. Roughly,
a preference relation is monotone if it is stable under prefix addition: that is, given two sequences of colors
such that one is strictly preferred to the other, it is impossible to reverse this order of preference by adding
the same prefix to both sequences. Selectivity is similarly defined with regard to cycle mixing: if a preference
relation is selective, then, starting from two sequences of colors, it is impossible to create a third one by
mixing the first two in such a way that the third one is strictly preferred to the first two. Observe that these
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elegant notions coincide with the natural intuition that memoryless strategies suffice if there is no interest
in behaving differently in a state depending on what happened before.
In addition to this complete characterization, Gimbert and Zielonka proved another great result, of high
interest in practice [25, Corollary 7]. As a by-product of their approach, they obtain that if memoryless
strategies suffice in all one-player games of P1 and all one-player games of P2, they also suffice in all two-
player games. Such a lifting corollary provides a neat and easy way to prove that a preference relation
admits memoryless optimal strategies without proving monotony and selectivity at all : proving it in the two
one-player subcases, which is generally much easier as it boils down to graph reasoning, and then lifting the
result to the general two-player case through the corollary.
The rise of memory. Over the last decade, the increasing need to model complex specifications has
shifted research toward games where multiple (quantitative and qualitative) objectives co-exist and interact,
requiring the analysis of interplay and trade-offs between several objectives. Hence, a lot of effort is put in
studying games where objectives are actually conjunctions of objectives, or even richer Boolean combinations.
See for example [15] for combinations of parity, [12,16,29] for combinations of energy and parity, [38] for
combinations of mean-payoff, [5,4] for combinations of energy and average-energy, [10] for combinations
of energy and mean-payoff, [13] for combinations of total-payoff, or [13,9,7] for combinations of window
objectives.
When considering such rich objectives, memoryless strategies usually do not suffice, and one has to use
an amount of memory which can quickly become an obstacle to implementation (e.g., exponential memory)
or which can prevent it completely (infinite memory). Establishing precise memory bounds for such general
combinations of objectives is tricky and sometimes counterintuitive. For example, while energy games and
mean-payoff games are inter-reducible in the single-objective setting, exponential-memory strategies are
both sufficient and necessary for conjunctions of energy objectives [16,29] while infinite-memory strategies
are required for conjunctions of mean-payoff ones [38].
A natural question arises: which preference relations do admit finite-memory optimal strategies? Sur-
prisingly, whether an equivalent to Gimbert and Zielonka’s characterization could be obtained in the finite-
memory case or not has remained an open question up to now. It is worth noticing that such an equivalent
could be of tremendous help in practice, especially if a lifting corollary also holds: see for example [5,4,10],
where proving that finite-memory strategies suffice in one-player games was fairly easy, in contrast to the
high complexity of the two-player case — a lifting corollary could grant the two-player case for free!
Having said that, one has to hope that the following corollary can be established: “if finite-memory
strategies suffice in all one-player games of P1 and all one-player games of P2, they also suffice in all two-
player games.” Unfortunately, this hope is but a delusion.
Lifting corollary: a counterexample. Consider games where the colors are integers, and the objective of
P1 is to create a play such that (a) the running sum of weights grows up to infinity (e.g., consider its lim inf
to define it properly), or (b) this running sum of weights takes value zero infinitely often. As this defines
a qualitative objective, the corresponding preference relation induces only two equivalence classes: winning
and losing plays. The inverse relation, used by P2, is trivial to obtain. It is fairly easy to prove that P1
always has finite-memory optimal strategies in his one-player games (i.e., games where he owns all states),
and so does P2 in his one-player games. See Appendix A for the details.
Now, consider the very simple two-player game depicted in Figure 1. First, observe that P1 (circle) has an
infinite-memory strategy to win: P1 should keep track of the running sum of weights (which is unbounded,
hence the need for infinite memory) and loop in s1 up to the point where this sum hits zero, when P1 should
then go to s2. This strategy ensures victory because either P2 always goes back to s1, in which case (b) is
satisfied; or P2 eventually loops forever on s2, in which case (a) is satisfied. It remains to argue that P1 has
no finite-memory winning strategy in this game. This can be done using a standard argument: whatever the
amount of memory used by P1, P2 may loop in s2 long enough as to exceed the bound up to which P1 can
track the sum accurately; thus dooming P1 to fail to reset the sum to zero in s1 infinitely often.
This modest example proves that Gimbert and Zielonka’s approach cannot work in full generality in the
finite-memory case, and for good reasons. Informally, in this case, the corollary breaks down because of (the
absence of some sort of) monotony. Recall that a preference relation is monotone if no matter how we reach a
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Fig. 1. P1 (circle) needs infinite memory to win in this game (by always resetting the sum of weights to zero by
looping long enough in s1 before going back to s2), whereas both players have finite-memory optimal strategies in all
one-player games using the same preference relations.
state (i.e., no matter the prefix), there is always one edge which is the best to pick. In the case of memoryless
strategies, as in [25], P1 is already doomed in one-player games in the absence of monotony: two prefixes to
distinguish can be hardcoded as different paths leading to the same state in a game arena, as if they were
chosen by P2 in a two-player game. In the case of finite-memory strategies, however, the situation is different.
In one-player games, the number of such paths that can be hardcoded in an arena is always bounded, hence
finite memory might suffice to react, i.e., to keep track of which prefix is the current one and how to behave
accordingly. However, in two-player games, P2 might create an infinite number of prefixes to distinguish
(using a cycle), thus requiring P1 to use infinite memory to be able to do so. This is exactly what happens
in the example above: in any one-player game, the largest sum that P1 has to track is bounded, whereas P2
can make this sum as large as he wants in two-player games.
Our approach. In a nutshell, we generalize Gimbert and Zielonka’s results — characterization and lifting
corollary — to the case of arena-independent finite memory. That is, we encompass all situations where the
amount of memory needed by the two players is solely dependent on the preference relation, and not on the
game arena. Let us take some classical examples to illustrate this notion.
– All memoryless-determined relations — studied in [25] — use arena-independent memory: the amount
of memory required, none, is the same for all arenas.
– Combinations of parity objectives use arena-independent memory [15]: the amount of memory only
depends on the number of objectives and the number of priorities — both parameters of the preference
relation, not on the size of the arena.
– Lower- and upper-bounded energy objectives also use arena-independent memory (see, e.g., [3,5,4]): the
memory only depends on the bounds — parameters of the preference relation, not on the size of the
arena, nor the weights used in it.
– Combinations of lower-bounded energy objectives (with no upper bound) require arena-dependent mem-
ory [16,29]: the memory depends on the size of the arena and the largest weight used in it. Such a setting
falls outside the scope of our results.
This informal concept of arena-independent memory is transparent in our work: in all our results, we use
memory skeletons — essentially Mealy machines without a next-action function (Section 2) — that suffice for
all arenas, and that are at the basis of the strategies we build. A quick look at our main concepts (Section 3.1)
and results (Section 3.2) suffices to grasp the formalism behind this intuition.
This restriction to arena-independent memory is natural given the counterexample to a general approach
presented above. It is also important to note that it is not as restrictive as it may seem, as hinted by the
examples above: we are not restricted to constant memory but to memory only depending on the parameters
of the preference relation (or equivalently, objective), and not of the arena. This framework thus already
encompasses many objectives from the literature, as well as possible extensions. We discuss this topic in
more details in Section 6, where we provide a precise description of the frontiers of our results within the
current research landscape.
We believe it should be possible to generalize our approach to some extent to the arena-dependent case,
through some function associating memory skeletons to arenas. Again, the previous example proves that this
would not hold in full generality, but our hope is to establish conditions on this function (which is induced
by the preference relation) under which the approach would hold. We leave this question open for now: this
paper paves the way to this more general setting.
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Let us highlight however that the arena-independent case, which we solve here, is an exact equivalent to
Gimbert and Zielonka’s results in the finite-memory case: the memoryless case is de facto arena-independent.
Therefore, this paper strictly generalizes [25] and captures lots of widely-studied classes of games (Section 6).
Outline of our contributions. Informally, our complete characterization can be stated as follows: given a
preference relation and a memory skeletonM, both players have optimal finite-memory strategies based on
skeleton M in all games if and only if the relation and its inverse areM-monotone and M-selective.
These last two concepts are keys to our approach. Intuitively, they correspond to Gimbert and Zielonka’s
monotony and selectivity, modulo a memory skeleton. Recall that monotony and selectivity are related to
stability of the preference relation with regard to prefix addition and cycle mixing, respectively. Our more
general concepts ofM-monotony andM-selectivity serve the same purpose, but they only compare sequences
of colors that are deemed equivalent by the memory skeleton. For the sake of illustration, take selectivity:
it implies that one has no interest in mixing different cycles of the game arena. For its generalization, the
memory skeleton is taken into account:M-selectivity implies that one has no interest in mixing cycles of the
game arena that are read as cycles on the same memory state in the skeleton M.
Let us give a quick breakdown of our approach. In Section 2, we introduce all basic notions, including
the memory skeletons, and we establish several technical results. Of particular importance is the discussion
of optimal strategies and Nash equilibria, their relationship, and their roles in our approach.
Section 3 is dedicated to our characterization, and consists of three parts. In Section 3.1, we introduce the
concepts of M-monotony and M-selectivity, cornerstones of our work. We also present two essential tools
to establish the characterization: prefix-covers and cyclic-covers of arenas. Section 3.2 states formally our
characterization (Theorem 16), as well as the corresponding lifting corollary (Corollary 18), from one-player
to two-player games, thus providing this coveted result of utmost practical interest. We close this overview
with an example of application, in Section 3.3.
The proof of the characterization (Theorem 16) is split in two. In Section 4, we establish the implica-
tion from (the sufficiency of) finite memory based on M to M-monotony (Theorem 19) and M-selectivity
(Theorem 20) of the preference relation. The main idea here is to build game arenas based on automata
recognizing the languages involved in the two concepts, and to use the existence of finite-memory optimal
strategies in these arenas to prove that M-monotony and M-selectivity hold.
In Section 5, we prove the converse implication. We proceed in two steps, first establishing the existence
of memoryless optimal strategies in “covered” arenas (Lemma 21 and Theorem 22), and then building on
it to obtain the existence of finite-memory optimal strategies in general arenas (Corollary 24). The main
technical tools we use are Nash equilibria and the aforementioned notions of prefix-covers and cyclic-covers.
We close the paper with a discussion of our characterization, presented in Section 6: we highlight some
limitations and interesting features, compare its scope with the current research landscape, and sketch
directions for future work.
Technical overview. Naturally, our technical approach is inspired by the one of Gimbert and Zielonka for
the memoryless case [25], which can actually be rediscovered through our results using a trivial memory
skeleton. Two of the most important challenges we had to overcome were:
1. establishing natural concepts of monotony and selectivity modulo memory that are exactly as powerful
as required to maintain a complete characterization (i.e., sufficient and necessary conditions) in the
finite-memory case;
2. circumventing the seemingly unavoidable coupling between the memory skeleton and the arena in the
inductive argument needed to prove the implication from M-monotony and M-selectivity to finite-
memory optimal strategies — which we were able to do using our notions of prefix-covers and cyclic-
covers.
All along our paper, we highlight the similarities and discrepancies between our work and Gimbert and
Zielonka’s [25]. Whenever possible, we also go further, using weaker hypotheses and proving stronger results,
along with addressing core problems left untouched in [25] (e.g., the role of the zero-sum hypothesis). In
that respect, we hope to shed a new light on the seminal results of [25] and offer a comprehensive, strongly-
motivated generalization of high practical interest.
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Related work. We already discussed the most important related papers, notably [25]. Let us highlight here
some works where similar approaches have been considered to establish “meta-theorems” applying to general
classes of games. First and foremost is the determinacy theorem by Martin that guarantees determinacy
(without considering the complexity of strategies) for Borel winning conditions [31].
Following the same motivation as our work — the need to characterize (combinations of) objectives
admitting finite-memory optimal strategies, Le Roux et al. [37] take another road: whereas our work permits
to lift results from one-player games to two-player games, they provide a lifting from the single-objective
case to the multi-objective one.
Our work focuses on deterministic turn-based two-player games. Sufficient conditions exist for stochastic
models but to the best of our knowledge, no complete characterization is known, even for the simplest case
of Markov decision processes (e.g., [23]). Whether part of our approach can be useful in this context, or
in richer contexts mixing games and stochastic models (e.g., [8]) is a question for future research. Some
sufficient criteria, orthogonal to our approach, were studied for concurrent games in [35].
Acknowledgments.We extend our warmest thanks to Mathieu Sassolas, for inspiring discussions that were
essential in starting this work.
2 Preliminaries
Automata and languages of colors. Let C be an arbitrary set of colors.
We recall classical notions on automata on finite words. A non-deterministic finite-state automaton (NFA)
is a tuple N = (Q,B, δ,Qinit, Qfin), where Q is a finite set of states, B ⊆ C is a finite alphabet of colors,
δ ⊆ Q×B ×Q is a set of transitions, Qinit ⊆ Q is a set of initial states, and Qfin ⊆ Q is a set of final states.
Given a state q ∈ Q and a word w ∈ B∗, we denote by δ̂(q, w) the set of states that can be reached from q
after reading w. Without loss of generality, we assume all NFAs to be coaccessible, i.e., for all q ∈ Q, there
exists w ∈ B∗, such that δ̂(q, w) ∩Qfin 6= ∅. Recall that NFAs precisely recognize regular languages.
For any finite subset B ⊆ C, we denote by Reg(B) the set of all regular languages over B. Let R(C) =⋃
B⊆C, |B|<∞ Reg(B), that is, all the regular languages built over C.
Let K ⊆ C∗ be a language of finite words. We denote by Prefs(K) the set of all prefixes of the words
in K. We define the set of infinite words [K] = {w = c1c2 . . . ∈ Cω | ∀n ≥ 1, c1 . . . cn ∈ Prefs(K)}, which
contains all infinite words for which every finite prefix is a prefix of a word in K. Intuitively, if K is regular,
language [K] corresponds to all the infinite words that can be read on an automaton for K: we will formalize
this in Lemma 2.
The following observation, already noted in [25], will come in handy too.
Lemma 1. Let K1,K2 ⊆ C∗. Then [K1 ∪K2] = [K1] ∪ [K2].
Proof. Let w ∈ [K1 ∪K2]. Every finite prefix of w is in Prefs(K1 ∪K2). Assume w.l.o.g. that infinitely many
prefixes of w are in Prefs(K1). This implies that all prefixes of w are in Prefs(K1) (intuitively, because there
is a continuity in the prefix relation). Hence, w ∈ [K1] ∪ [K2].
Now, let w ∈ [K1]∪ [K2]. If w ∈ [K1] (resp. [K2]), every finite prefix of w is in Prefs(K1) (resp. Prefs(K2)),
so in particular it is in Prefs(K1 ∪K2). Hence, w ∈ [K1 ∪K2]. ⊓⊔
Arenas. We consider two players: player 1 (P1) and player 2 (P2). An arena is a tuple A = (S1, S2, E) such
that S = S1 ⊎ S2 (disjoint union) is a finite set of states partitioned into states of P1 (S1) and P2 (S2), and
E ⊆ S×C×S is a finite set of edges. Let col : E → C be the projection of edges to colors and ĉol its natural
extension to sequences of edges. For an edge e ∈ E, we use in(e) and out(e) to denote its starting state and
arrival state respectively, i.e., e = (in(e), col(e), out(e)). We assume all arenas to be non-blocking, i.e., for all
s ∈ S, there exists e ∈ E such that in(e) = s.
Let Hists(A, s) denote the set of histories in A from initial state s ∈ S, i.e., finite sequences of edges
ρ = e1 . . . en ∈ E+ such that in(e1) = s and for all i, 1 ≤ i < n, out(ei) = in(ei+1). Let Plays(A, s) denote
the set of plays in A from initial state s ∈ S, i.e., infinite sequences of edges pi = e1e2 . . . ∈ Eω such that
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in(e1) = s and for all i ≥ 1, out(ei) = in(ei+1). We write Hists(A, S′) and Plays(A, S′) for the unions over
subsets of initial states S′ ⊆ S, and write Hists(A) and Plays(A) for the unions over all states of A.
Let ρ = e1 . . . en ∈ Hists(A) (resp. pi = e1e2 . . . ∈ Plays(A)): we extend the operator in to histories
(resp. plays) by identifying in(ρ) (resp. in(pi)) to in(e1). We proceed similarly for out and histories: out(ρ) =
out(en). For the sake of convenience, we consider that any set Hists(A, s) contains the empty history λs
such that in(λs) = out(λs) = s. We write Histsi(A, s) and Histsi(A) for the subsets of histories ρ such that
out(ρ) ∈ Si, i ∈ {1, 2}, i.e., histories whose last state belongs to Pi.
For any set of histories H ⊆ Hists(A), we write ĉol(H) for its projection to colors, i.e., ĉol(H) = {ĉol(ρ) |
ρ ∈ H}. We do the same for sets of plays.
Memory skeletons. A memory skeleton is a tuple M = (M,minit, αupd) where M is a finite set of states,
minit ∈M is a fixed initial state and αupd : M ×C →M is an update function. We write α̂upd for the natural
extension of αupd to sequences of colors in C
∗. Note that memory skeletons are deterministic and might have
an infinite number of transitions, in contrast to NFAs.
Let M = (M,minit, αupd) be a memory skeleton. For m,m′ ∈ M , we define the language Lm,m′ =
{w ∈ C∗ | α̂upd(m,w) = m′} that contains all words that can be read from m to m′ in M.
LetM1 = (M1,m1init, α
1
upd) andM
2 = (M2,m2init, α
2
upd) be two memory skeletons. We define their product
M1 ⊗ M2 as the memory skeleton M = (M,minit, αupd) obtained as follows: M = M1 × M2, minit =
(m1init,m
2
init), and, for all m
1 ∈ M1, m2 ∈ M2, c ∈ C, αupd((m1,m2), c) = (α1upd(m
1, c), α2upd(m
2, c)). That is,
the memories are updated in parallel when a color is read.
Product arenas. Let A = (S1, S2, E) be an arena and M = (M,minit, αupd) be a memory skeleton. We
define their product A⋉M as the arena (S′1, S
′
2, E
′) where S′1 = S1×M , S
′
2 = S2×M , and E
′ ⊆ S′×C×S′,
with S′ = S′1 ⊎ S
′
2, is such that ((s1,m1), c, (s2,m2)) ∈ E
′ if and only if (s1, c, s2) ∈ E and αupd(m1, c) = m2.
That is, the memory is updated according to the colors of the edges in E. Note that even though M might
contain an infinite number of transitions since C might be infinite, A⋉M is always finite, as E is finite in
A. Since we assume arena A is non-blocking, it is also the case of arena A⋉M.
Arena induced by an NFA. Let N = (Q,B, δ,Qinit, Qfin) be an NFA. We say that a state q ∈ Q is
essential if there exists an infinite path in N starting in q. Let Qess = {q ∈ Q | q is essential}. We define the
corresponding one-player arena Arena(N ) = (S1 = Qess, S2 = ∅, E ⊆ Qess×B×Qess), where e = (q, c, q′) ∈ E
if (q, c, q′) ∈ δ. Intuitively, Arena(N ) transforms N into a non-blocking arena thanks to the restriction to
essential states.
We may now state formally the link between [K] and the underlying automaton for K. Our proof is
similar to [25, Lemma 4].
Lemma 2. Let N = (Q,B, δ,Qinit, Qfin) be a (coaccessible) NFA recognizing the regular language K ⊆ C∗.
Let Q′init = Qinit ∩Qess. The following equality holds:
[K] = ĉol
(
Plays (Arena(N ), Q′init)
)
.
In particular, [K] is non-empty if and only if there exists an essential initial state in N .
Proof. If Q′init is empty, the equality trivially holds: ĉol
(
Plays (Arena(N ), Q′init)
)
and [K] are both empty.
Hence, from now on, we assume Q′init 6= ∅.
We start with the left-to-right inclusion. Let w = c1c2 . . . ∈ [K]. We first prove that for all n ≥ 1, it holds
that
c1 . . . cn ∈ ĉol
(
Hists (Arena(N ), Q′init)
)
.
We assume on the contrary that there exists n ≥ 1 such that c1 . . . cn /∈ ĉol
(
Hists (Arena(N ), Q′init)
)
. As
Arena(N ) is a restriction of the states of N to Qess, this means that no matter how c1 . . . cn is read on N , it
goes through a state in Q \Qess. As there is no infinite path from these states, this contradicts that w ∈ [K];
there cannot be arbitrarily long prefixes starting with c1 . . . cn.
We now use the property that we have just proved along with Ko¨nig’s lemma to show that w ∈
ĉol
(
Plays (Arena(N ), Q′init)
)
. We build a forest of trees F . The vertices ofF are paths ρ ∈ Hists (Arena(N ), Q′init)
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such that ĉol(ρ) is a prefix of w and in(ρ) ∈ Q′init. For every q ∈ Q
′
init, there is one tree in F whose root is the
empty path λq . There is a transition from a vertex ρ to a vertex ρ
′ if there exists e ∈ E such that ρ ·e = ρ′. As
there is at least one vertex for each prefix c1 . . . cn, (at least) one of the trees of F must be infinite. Moreover,
F is finitely branching. By Ko¨nig’s lemma, we obtain that there must be an infinite path pi starting from a
root λq for some q ∈ Q′init. By construction, ĉol(pi) = w, so w ∈ ĉol
(
Plays (Arena(N ), Q′init)
)
.
We now prove the right-to-left inclusion. Let pi = e1e2 . . . ∈ Plays (Arena(N ), Q′init). For n ≥ 1, the word
ĉol(e1 . . . en) is the color of a path in N , since every edge of Arena(N ) corresponds to a transition of N . As
N is coaccessible, there is a path in N from the state corresponding to out(en) to a final state in Qfin. Thus,
the word ĉol(e1 . . . en) is a prefix of an accepted word of N , i.e., a prefix of a word in K; as this holds for all
n ≥ 1, we obtain that ĉol(pi) ∈ [K]. ⊓⊔
Strategies. A strategy σi for Pi, i ∈ {1, 2}, on arena A = (S1, S2, E), is a function σi : Histsi(A)→ E such
that for all ρ ∈ Histsi(A), in(σi(ρ)) = out(ρ). Let Σi(A) be the set of all strategies of Pi on A.
A finite-memory strategy σi is a strategy that can be encoded as a Mealy machine, i.e., a memory
skeleton M = (M,minit, αupd) with transitions over a finite subset of colors B ⊆ C, enriched with a next-
action function αnxt : M × Si → E such that for all m ∈ M , s ∈ Si, in(αnxt(m, s)) = s. Given a Mealy
machine Γσi = (M, αnxt), strategy σi is defined as follows:
– ∀ s ∈ Si, σi(λs) = αnxt(minit, s),
– ∀ ρ · e ∈ Histsi(A), e ∈ E, σi(ρ · e) = αnxt
(
α̂upd
(
minit, ĉol (ρ · e)
)
, out(e)
)
.
We denote by ΣFMi (A) the set of all finite-memory strategies of Pi on A. We say that a strategy σi ∈ Σ
FM
i (A)
is based on memory skeleton M if it can be encoded as a Mealy machine Γσi = (M, αnxt), as above. We
always implicitly assume that strategies of ΣFMi (A) are built by restricting the transitions of their skeleton
M to the actual subset of colors appearing in A. A strategy σi is memoryless if it is a function σi : Si → E,
or equivalently, if its Mealy machine uses only one state. We denote by ΣMLi (A) the set of all memoryless
strategies of Pi on A.
We denote by Plays(A, s, σi) the set of plays consistent with a strategy σi of Pi from an initial state s, i.e.,
all plays pi = e1e2 . . . ∈ Plays(A, s) such that for all prefixes ρ = e1 . . . en, out(ρ) ∈ Si =⇒ σi(ρ) = en+1. We
write Plays(A, s, σ1, σ2) for the singleton set containing the unique play consistent with a couple of strategies
for the two players. We use similar notations for histories.
Preference relations. Let ⊑ be a total preorder on Cω, called preference relation. We consider antagonistic
games, where the objective of P1 is to create the best possible play with regard to ⊑ whereas the objective
of P2 is to obtain the worst possible one. That is, P2 uses the inverse relation ⊑
−1. This corresponds to
zero-sum games when using a quantitative framework.
Given w,w′ ∈ Cω, we write w ⊏ w′ if we have ¬(w′ ⊑ w) since the preorder is total. We extend the
relation ⊑ to subsets of Cω as follows: for W,W ′ ⊆ Cω,
W ⊑W ′ ⇐⇒ ∀w ∈W, ∃w′ ∈W ′, w ⊑ w′.
We also write
W ⊏W ′ ⇐⇒ ∃w′ ∈W ′, ∀w ∈W, w ⊏ w′.
Note that W ⊏W ′ if and only if ¬(W ′ ⊑W ).
We sometimes compare words w ∈ Cω with languages K ⊆ Cω, by simply identifying word w to its
singleton language {w}.
Games. A game is a tuple G = (A,⊑) where A is an arena and ⊑ is a preference relation. As discussed in
Section 1, all the classical objectives from the literature (both qualitative and quantitative) can be expressed
in the general framework of preference relations.
Example 3. There are two prominent ways to formalize game objectives in the literature: through payoff
functions and through winning conditions. We take an example of each.
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First, consider (lim inf) mean-payoff games [18]. In this setting, colors are integers, i.e., C = Z, and the
goal of P1 is to create a play pi, with w = ĉol(pi) = c1c2 . . . , maximizing the following payoff function:
MP(w) = lim inf
n→∞
1
n
n∑
i=1
ci.
Such a payoff function induces a natural preference relation ⊑MP between sequences of colors as follows: for
all w,w′ ∈ Cω, w ⊑MP w′ if and only if MP(w) ≤ MP(w′). Such quantitative games are zero-sum, hence P2
uses the natural inverse relation ⊑−1MP: he is a minimizer player in the payoff formulation of these games.
Second, consider reachability games (e.g., [20]). In this setting, only two colors are needed: one for edges
in the target set, and one for the other edges. Let us use ⊤ and ⊥ respectively to color these two sets of
edges, i.e., C = {⊤,⊥}. Then, the winning condition can be simply written asW = {w ∈ Cω | ⊤ ∈ w} ( Cω.
In such games, the goal of P1 is to create a play pi such that ĉol(pi) ∈ W , called winning play. Defining
a corresponding preference relation ⊑reach is straightforward: for all w,w′ ∈ Cω , w ⊏reach w′ if and only if
w′ ∈W and w 6∈W . That is, ⊑reach defines two equivalence classes: losing and winning plays. This qualitative
setting is antagonistic, hence P2 uses the inverse relation ⊑
−1
reach: his winning condition is W = C
ω \W in
the classical formulation of these games.
As explained in Section 1, quantitative games are often reduced to qualitative ones by fixing a threshold
to achieve. ⊳
Optimal strategies. Let G = (A,⊑) be a game on arena A = (S1, S2, E). Given a Pi-strategy σi ∈ Σi(A)
and a state s ∈ S, we define
UCol⊑(A, s, σi) = {w ∈ C
ω | ∃σ3−i ∈ Σ3−i(A), ĉol(Plays(A, s, σ1, σ2)) ⊑ w},
DCol⊑(A, s, σi) = {w ∈ C
ω | ∃σ3−i ∈ Σ3−i(A), w ⊑ ĉol(Plays(A, s, σ1, σ2))}.
Note that DCol⊑(A, s, σi) = UCol⊑−1(A, s, σi). Intuitively, UCol⊑ and DCol⊑ represent the upward and
downward closures of sequences of colors (consistent with a strategy) with respect to the preference relation.
Taking the standpoint of P1, we say that a strategy σ1 ∈ Σ1(A) is at least as good as a strategy σ′1 ∈ Σ1(A)
from a state s ∈ S if
UCol⊑(A, s, σ1) ⊆ UCol⊑(A, s, σ
′
1).
Intuitively, σ1 is at least as good as σ
′
1 if the “worst-case” plays consistent with σ1 are at least as good as
the ones consistent with σ′1. The UCol operator is useful to define this notion properly even in the case where
there is no “worst-case” play for a strategy (i.e., if the infimum used in the classical quantitative setting is
not reached). Similar notions have been used before, e.g., in [34].
Symmetrically, for P2, we say that a strategy σ2 ∈ Σ2(A) is at least as good as a strategy σ′2 ∈ Σ2(A)
from a state s ∈ S if
DCol⊑(A, s, σ2) ⊆ DCol⊑(A, s, σ
′
2).
Now, we say that a strategy σi ∈ Σi(A) of Pi is optimal from a state s ∈ S, aka s-optimal, if it is at
least as good as every other strategy σ′i ∈ Σi(A) from s. We extend this notation to subsets of states in the
natural way, and we say that a strategy σi is uniformly-optimal if it is S-optimal.
The goal of our paper is to characterize the preference relations that admit uniformly-optimal finite-
memory (UFM) strategies in all arenas. We also discuss the simpler case of uniformly-optimal memory-
less (UML) strategies, which corresponds to the subset of preference relations studied by Gimbert and
Zielonka [25].
In that respect, the following link is important to observe.
Lemma 4. Let G = (A,⊑) be a game on arena A = (S1, S2, E). Let M = (M,minit, αupd) be a memory
skeleton and let σi ∈ ΣFMi (A) be a finite-memory strategy encoded by the Mealy machine Γσi = (M, αnxt).
Then, σi is a UFM strategy in G if and only if αnxt corresponds to an (S × {minit})-optimal memoryless
strategy in G′ = (A⋉M,⊑).
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Proof. We first aim to define a bijection H : Hists(A) → Hists(A ⋉M, S × {minit}). Let ρ = e1 . . . en ∈
Hists(A), with ej = (sj , cj, sj+1). We set m1 = minit, and for 2 ≤ j ≤ n, mj = αupd(mj−1, cj). We define
e′j = ((sj ,mj), cj , (sj+1,mj+1)), and H(ρ) = e
′
1 . . . e
′
n. Notice that ĉol(H(ρ)) = ĉol(ρ). Furthermore, H is
bijective; as the initial state of the memory minit is fixed and the memory skeleton is deterministic, the
memory states added to ρ to obtain H(ρ) are uniquely determined.
We now show that there is a correspondence between strategies of Σi(A) and strategies of Σi(A ⋉M):
intuitively, augmenting the arena with the skeleton allows some strategies to be played using less memory,
but does not fundamentally change each player’s possibilities. We define a function f : Σi(A)→ Σi(A⋉M).
For τi ∈ Σi(A) and ρ′ ∈ Histsi(A ⋉M) with in(ρ′) ∈ S × {minit} and out(ρ′) = (s,m) ∈ Si × M , if
τi(H−1(ρ′)) = (s, c, s′), we define f(τi)(ρ′) = ((s,m), c, (s′, αupd(m, c))). The histories induced by strategies
τi and f(τi) correspond: if ρ = H−1(ρ′), then we have
H(ρ · τi(ρ)) = ρ
′ · (f(τi)(ρ
′)). (1)
We are only interested in the behavior of strategies of Σi(A ⋉M) on histories ρ
′ with in(ρ′) ∈ S × {minit}
(in what follows, we will only consider histories and plays starting in such states). If we restrict the image of
f to the set of strategies τ ′i : Histsi(A⋉M, S × {minit})→ E
′, then f is a bijection.
Consider the next-action function αnxt of strategy σi. Formally, we have to transform αnxt into a proper
memoryless strategy in ΣMLi (A ⋉M). This can be done through the bijection f , yielding the memoryless
strategy α′nxt = f(σi), which corresponds to αnxt interpreted over the product arena, and well-defined for all
histories starting in S × {minit}.
We now show a second fact related to f : we have that for all s ∈ S, for all τ1 ∈ Σ1(A), τ2 ∈ Σ2(A),
ĉol
(
Plays(A, s, τ1, τ2)
)
= ĉol
(
Plays(A⋉M, (s,minit), f(τ1), f(τ2))
)
. (2)
This can easily be proved by induction using Equation (1). Indeed, at each step, both strategy τ1 (resp. τ2)
and strategy f(τ1) (resp. f(τ2)) pick an edge with the same color.
We finish the proof assuming that σi = σ1 ∈ Σ
FM
1 (A); the proof is symmetric for P2. Equation (2) implies
that for all s ∈ S, τ1 ∈ Σ1(A),
UCol⊑(A, s, τ1) = {w ∈ C
ω | ∃ τ2 ∈ Σ2(A), ĉol
(
Plays(A, s, τ1, τ2)
)
⊑ w}
= {w ∈ Cω | ∃ τ2 ∈ Σ2(A), ĉol
(
Plays(A⋉M, (s,minit), f(τ1), f(τ2))
)
⊑ w}
= {w ∈ Cω | ∃ τ ′2 ∈ Σ2(A⋉M), ĉol
(
Plays(A⋉M, (s,minit), f(τ1), τ
′
2)
)
⊑ w}
= UCol⊑(A⋉M, (s,minit), f(τ1)). (3)
where the penultimate equality uses that the aforementioned restriction of f is bijective.
Using Equation (3), we can obtain that a strategy τ1 is uniformly-optimal in G = (A,⊑) if and only if
f(τ1) ∈ Σ1(A ⋉M) is (S × {minit})-optimal in G′ = (A ⋉M,⊑). In particular, σ1 is uniformly-optimal in
G if and only if f(σ1) = α
′
nxt is (S × {minit})-optimal in G
′. ⊓⊔
Nash equilibria.We use Nash equilibria [32] as tools to establish the existence of optimal strategies in some
of our proofs. Let G = (A,⊑) be a game on arena A = (S1, S2, E). Formally, a Nash equilibrium (NE) from
a state s ∈ S is a couple of strategies (σ1, σ2) ∈ Σ1(A) ×Σ2(A) such that, for all σ′1 ∈ Σ1(A), σ
′
2 ∈ Σ2(A),
ĉol(Plays(A, s, σ′1, σ2)) ⊑ ĉol(Plays(A, s, σ1, σ2)) ⊑ ĉol(Plays(A, s, σ1, σ
′
2)). (4)
Similarly to optimal strategies, we call an NE uniform if it is an NE from all states s ∈ S.
It is worth taking a moment to discuss the link between optimal strategies and Nash equilibria in our
specific context of antagonistic games. Both notions seem closely related, and indeed, in [25], Gimbert and
Zielonka did choose Equation (4) — i.e., the definition of a Nash equilibrium — as their definition of a pair
of optimal strategies. This could lead the reader to believe that both notions coincide. However, they do not
in full generality, as we discuss in the following.
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Additionally, defining optimality for a pair of strategies gives rise to difficulties as one naturally wants
to reason about optimal strategies of a player without talking about the (possibly optimal) strategy of its
adversary. Our definition of optimal strategy has the advantage of giving a clear and precise definition that
does not involve the standpoint of the adversary.
As stated before, the ultimate goal of our paper is to characterize preference relations that admit finite-
memory optimal strategies, but Nash equilibria will serve as tools in our endeavor. Let us establish two
interesting properties of Nash equilibria in antagonistic games.
First, it is possible to mix different Nash equilibria.
Lemma 5. Let G = (A,⊑) be a game on arena A = (S1, S2, E), and let s ∈ S be a state. Let (σa1 , σ
a
2 ) and
(σb1, σ
b
2) ∈ Σ1(A)×Σ2(A) be two Nash equilibria from s. Then, (σ
a
1 , σ
b
2) is also a Nash equilibrium from s.
Proof. We need to prove that for all σ′1 ∈ Σ1(A), σ
′
2 ∈ Σ2(A),
ĉol(Plays(A, s, σ′1, σ
b
2)) ⊑ ĉol(Plays(A, s, σ
a
1 , σ
b
2)) ⊑ ĉol(Plays(A, s, σ
a
1 , σ
′
2)). (5)
Since (σa1 , σ
a
2 ) is an NE, we know that
ĉol(Plays(A, s, σb1, σ
a
2 )) ⊑ ĉol(Plays(A, s, σ
a
1 , σ
a
2 )) ⊑ ĉol(Plays(A, s, σ
a
1 , σ
b
2)),
instantiating σ′1 and σ
′
2 to σ
b
1 and σ
b
2 respectively in Equation (4). Similarly, since (σ
b
1, σ
b
2) is an NE, we know
that
ĉol(Plays(A, s, σa1 , σ
b
2)) ⊑ ĉol(Plays(A, s, σ
b
1, σ
b
2)) ⊑ ĉol(Plays(A, s, σ
b
1, σ
a
2 )),
instantiating σ′1 and σ
′
2 to σ
a
1 and σ
a
2 respectively in Equation (4).
Now it is easy to see from the last two lines that all six sequences of colors are equivalent under
⊑ as the inequalities form a cycle. Hence, since Equation (4) holds for (σa1 , σ
a
2 ) and (σ
b
1, σ
b
2), and since
ĉol(Plays(A, s, σa1 , σ
b
2)) is⊑-equivalent to both ĉol(Plays(A, s, σ
a
1 , σ
a
2 )) and ĉol(Plays(A, s, σ
b
1, σ
b
2)), Equation (5)
is trivially verified. That concludes our proof. ⊓⊔
Remark 6. Lemma 5 crucially relies on the assumption (transparent in our definition of Nash equilibrium)
that we consider antagonistic games, that is, P2 uses the inverse preference relation ⊑
−1. Actually, our
approach almost completely carries over to the general case where P1 and P2 use two different, unrelated,
preference relations: the single breaking point being the use of Lemma 5 in Theorem 22 to preserve memo-
ryless Nash equilibria in the induction step. ⊳
We now establish that Nash equilibria induce optimal strategies (again, in our antagonistic context).
Lemma 7. Let G = (A,⊑) be a game on arena A = (S1, S2, E), and let s ∈ S be a state. Let (σ1, σ2) ∈
Σ1(A)×Σ2(A) be a Nash equilibrium from s. Then, both σ1 and σ2 are s-optimal strategies.
Proof. We do the proof for P1 (it works symmetrically for P2). Let (σ1, σ2) ∈ Σ1(A) × Σ2(A) be a Nash
equilibrium from s ∈ S. Consider the rightmost inequality of Equation (4). From it, we deduce that
UCol⊑(A, s, σ1) = {w ∈ C
ω | ĉol(Plays(A, s, σ1, σ2)) ⊑ w}. (6)
Indeed, σ2 is the best response [32] to σ1.
We claim that σ1 is at least as good as every other strategy, hence that σ1 is optimal. Let σ
′
1 ∈ Σ1(A).
We need to prove that UCol⊑(A, s, σ1) ⊆ UCol⊑(A, s, σ
′
1). Let w ∈ UCol⊑(A, s, σ1). From Equation (6)
and the leftmost inequality of Equation (4), we have ĉol(Plays(A, s, σ′1, σ2)) ⊑ w. Hence, by definition,
w ∈ UCol⊑(A, s, σ′1), which concludes our proof. ⊓⊔
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As noted above, optimal strategies do not always coincide with Nash equilibria. Intuitively, they do
coincide in the classical quantitative formulation (using payoff functions) if the value of the game exists, that
is, if the best payoff that P1 can guarantee is equal to the worst payoff that P2 can guarantee [32]. In a sense,
our concepts of UCol⊑ and DCol⊑ are meant to mimic the classical sup inf and inf sup formulations in our
abstract context where objectives are described as preference relations.
So (quantitative) games do not always have a value, and similarly, in our context, optimal strategies as
defined above do not always induce a Nash equilibrium. That being said, they do for arguably all reasonable
preference relations, as Martin’s determinacy result grants the existence of winning strategies — in our
formalism, Nash equilibria — for all Borel winning conditions [31]. That is, for the equivalence to fail, we
would need a preference relation capable of inducing non-Borel sets of winning plays (once a threshold is
chosen).
Remark 8. The main contribution of our paper is an equivalence between the existence of UFM strategies
(based on M) and upcoming notions of M-monotony and M-selectivity of the relation. It is worth noting
that we only need optimal strategies in the left-to-right direction (Theorem 19 and Theorem 20) — and not
the stronger notion of Nash equilibrium— while we do prove the existence of finite-memory Nash equilibria in
the other direction (Theorem 22 and Corollary 24). That is, whenever possible, we use the weakest hypothesis
and prove the strongest result. ⊳
Remark 9. In one-player games, the two visions — optimal strategies and Nash equilibria — coincide. ⊳
Remark 10. Lemma 4 can be restated in terms of Nash equilibria, using a similar reasoning. ⊳
3 Characterization
We are now able to establish our characterization of preference relations admitting finite-memory optimal
strategies. We proceed in three steps. First, in Section 3.1, we present the core concepts of this character-
ization, i.e., the properties that preference relations must verify to yield UFM strategies. Second, we state
our equivalence result in Section 3.2, alongside a corollary of utmost practical importance that lets one lift
results from the one-player case to the two-player one. We defer the formal proofs of both directions of the
equivalence to Section 4 and Section 5, and only explain here how to combine them. Finally, we provide an
illustrative application of our characterization in Section 3.3.
3.1 Concepts
Generalizing monotony and selectivity. As discussed in Section 1, Gimbert and Zielonka’s characteriza-
tion [25] relies on notions of monotony and selectivity of the preference relation. One of the main stumbling
blocks to lift their characterization to the finite-memory case was finding natural counterparts to these
notions that would capture the additional intricacy of this more general setting.
Intuitively, one huge difference between Gimbert and Zielonka’s technical approach and ours is the fol-
lowing. In the memoryless setting, all the reasoning can be abstracted away from the underlying arena and
done at the level of sequences of colors. In the finite-memory one, however, one has to pay attention to how
sequences of colors are composed and compared, to maintain integrity with regard to the memory and the
underlying game arena. In a sense, this need to intertwine abstract reasoning on arbitrary sequences of colors
with concrete tracking of memory updates has been a constant obstacle that prevented the emergence of a
complete characterization since Gimbert and Zielonka’s result in 2005. This issue can be observed in related
works, as discussed in Section 1, along with partial answers to the problem (e.g., [37]).
Much of our effort was thus spent on trying to define concepts that would preserve the elegance of
monotony and selectivity while allowing us to lift the theory to the finite-memory case. As often the case in
these endeavors, the good concepts turned out to be the most natural ones, capturing the intuitive idea that
one needs monotony and selectivity modulo a memory skeleton.
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Definition 11 (M-monotony). Let M = (M,minit, αupd) be a memory skeleton. A preference relation ⊑
is M-monotone if for all m ∈M , for all K1,K2 ∈ R(C),
∃w ∈ Lminit,m, [wK1] ⊏ [wK2] =⇒ ∀w
′ ∈ Lminit,m, [w
′K1] ⊑ [w
′K2]. (7)
Recall that a memory skeletonM has a fixed initial stateminit. Intuitively,M-monotony extends Gimbert
and Zielonka’s monotony by asking one to compare prefixes belonging to the same language Lminit,m, that is,
prefixes that are deemed equivalent by the memory skeleton. This property roughly captures that ⊑ is stable
with regard to prefix addition, for memory-equivalent prefixes.
Observe that the original monotony notion is exactly equivalent to our M-monotony if M is a trivial
memory skeleton with only one state: that is, the memoryless case is naturally a specific subcase of our
framework.
Definition 12 (M-selectivity). Let M = (M,minit, αupd) be a memory skeleton. A preference relation ⊑
is M-selective if for all w ∈ C∗, m = α̂upd(minit, w), for all K1,K2 ∈ R(C) such that K1,K2 ⊆ Lm,m, for
all K3 ∈ R(C),
[w(K1 ∪K2)
∗K3] ⊑ [wK
∗
1 ] ∪ [wK
∗
2 ] ∪ [wK3]. (8)
Similarly, M-selectivity extends Gimbert and Zielonka’s selectivity by asking one to compare sequences
of colors belonging to the same language Lm,m, that is, sequences read as cycles on the memory skeleton.
Note also that the memory state m should be consistent with the prefix w read from the initial memory state
minit. This property roughly captures that ⊑ is stable with regard to cycle mixing, for memory-equivalent
cycles.
Again, observe that the original selectivity notion is exactly equivalent to our M-selectivity if M is a
trivial memory skeleton with only one state.
Our notions respect the natural intuition that access to additional memory should always be helpful:
if a skeleton M is sufficient to classify sequences of colors in a way that guarantees M-monotony and
M-selectivity, then it should also be the case for “more powerful” skeletons.
Lemma 13. Let M and M′ be two memory skeletons. If ⊑ is M-monotone (resp. M-selective) then, it is
also (M⊗M′)-monotone (resp. (M⊗M′)-selective).
Proof. We write M = (M,minit, αupd) and M′ = (M ′,m′init, α
′
upd).
Let us assume that ⊑ is M-monotone, that is, for all m ∈M , for all K1,K2 ∈ R(C),
∃w ∈ Lminit,m, [wK1] ⊏ [wK2] =⇒ ∀w
′ ∈ Lminit,m, [w
′K1] ⊑ [w
′K2]. (9)
We show that ⊑ is (M⊗M′)-monotone, that is, for all (m,m′) ∈M ×M ′, for all K1,K2 ∈ R(C),
∃w ∈ L(minit,m′init),(m,m′), [wK1] ⊏ [wK2] =⇒ ∀w
′ ∈ L(minit,m′init),(m,m′), [w
′K1] ⊑ [w
′K2]. (10)
To do so, we notice that L(minit,m′init),(m,m′) ⊆ Lminit,m (the product of memory skeletons simply updates both
memories in parallel). Thus, if the premise of Equation (10) holds, we obtain by Equation (9) that the
conclusion of Equation (10) also holds.
A similar argument can be laid out to show thatM-selectivity implies (M⊗M′)-selectivity. It is enough
to notice that for all (m,m′) ∈ M ×M ′, we have L(m,m′),(m,m′) ⊆ Lm,m: the definition of M-selectivity is
thus clearly stronger than the definition of (M⊗M′)-selectivity. ⊓⊔
Prefix-covers and cyclic-covers. While the aforementioned concepts of M-monotony and M-selectivity
are the primordial ones for stating the characterization, we still need two additional notions to prove it.
Let us sketch the issue here already. To prove that monotone and selective preference relations yield
UML strategies, Gimbert and Zielonka deploy an inductive argument on the number of choices in an arena.
Intuitively, we want to use a similar approach for UFM strategies, but because of the unavoidable coupling
between the memory skeleton and the arena (e.g., Lemma 4), the induction argument breaks, as adding one
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choice in the arena results in adding many in the product arena (as many as there are memory states), where
the reasoning needs to take place.
To solve this issue, we decouple the two aspects (see Section 5). Intuitively, we first establish that, on
arenas that inherently share the same good properties as product arenas (that is, they already “classify”
prefixes and cycles as the memory would), we can deploy the induction argument and obtain UML strategies.
Then, we obtain the result for UFM strategies on general arenas as a corollary. The crux is identifying such
“good” arenas: this is done through the following notions.
Definition 14 (Prefix-covers and cyclic-covers). Let M = (M,minit, αupd) be a memory skeleton and
A = (S1, S2, E) be an arena. Let Scov ⊆ S.
We say that M is a prefix-cover of Scov in A if for all s ∈ S, there exists ms ∈ M such that, for all
ρ ∈ Hists(A) such that in(ρ) ∈ Scov and out(ρ) = s, α̂upd(minit, ĉol(ρ)) = ms.
We say that M is a cyclic-cover of Scov in A if for all ρ ∈ Hists(A) such that in(ρ) ∈ Scov, if s = out(ρ)
and m = α̂upd(minit, ĉol(ρ)), for all ρ
′ ∈ Hists(A) such that in(ρ′) = out(ρ′) = s, α̂upd(m, ĉol(ρ′)) = m.
Intuitively, M is a prefix-cover for a set of states Scov if the histories starting in Scov and ending in a given
state s ∈ S are read up to the same memory state in the memory skeleton. Similarly,M is a cyclic-cover of A
if the cycles of A are read as cycles in the memory skeleton, once the memory has been initialized properly.
As hinted above, the canonical example of a prefix-covered and cyclic-covered arena is a product arena
(but many more may be in this case, hence it is beneficial to be general with these concepts).
Lemma 15. Let M = (M,minit, αupd) be a memory skeleton and A = (S1, S2, E) be an arena. Then M is
both a prefix-cover and a cyclic-cover for Scov = S × {minit} in the product arena A⋉M.
Proof. The main argument that we will be using in this proof is that if there is a history ρ with in(ρ) = (s,m)
and out(ρ) = (s′,m′) in the product arena A ⋉M, then reading ĉol(ρ) from m in the memory skeleton M
leads to m′ (i.e., α̂upd(m, ĉol(ρ)) = m
′). This can be easily proved by induction on the length of ρ, thanks to
how the product arena is built.
We first show that M is a prefix-cover for Scov = S × {minit} in the product arena A ⋉M. What
we have to prove, instantiating the definition of prefix-cover in this case, is that for all (s,m) ∈ S ×M ,
there exists m(s,m) ∈ M such that, for all ρ ∈ Hists(A ⋉M) such that in(ρ) ∈ Scov and out(ρ) = (s,m),
α̂upd(minit, ĉol(ρ)) = m(s,m). Let (s,m) ∈ M ; we take m(s,m) = m. Then, if ρ ∈ Hists(A ⋉M) is such that
in(ρ) ∈ Scov (that is, is equal to (s′,minit) for some s′ ∈ S), and out(ρ) = (s,m), we have by construction of
the product arena that α̂upd(minit, ĉol(ρ)) = m = m(s,m), as required.
To prove that M is a cyclic-cover for Scov in A ⋉M, we have to prove that for all ρ ∈ Hists(A ⋉M)
such that in(ρ) ∈ Scov, if (s,m) = out(ρ) and m′ = α̂upd(minit, ĉol(ρ)), for all ρ′ ∈ Hists(A ⋉M) such that
in(ρ′) = out(ρ′) = (s,m), α̂upd(m
′, ĉol(ρ′)) = m′. Let ρ ∈ Hists(A ⋉M) such that in(ρ) ∈ Scov (that is,
in(ρ) = (s′,minit) for some s
′ ∈ S). Then, if (s,m) = out(ρ), we have by construction of the product arena
that m′ = α̂upd(minit, ĉol(ρ)) = m. Let ρ
′ ∈ Hists(A⋉M) such that in(ρ′) = out(ρ′) = (s,m). By construction
of the product arena, we therefore have that α̂upd(m, ĉol(ρ
′)) = m, as required. ⊓⊔
3.2 Main results
Equivalence. We now have the necessary ingredients to state our general equivalence result formally.
Theorem 16 (Equivalence). Let ⊑ be a preference relation and let M be a memory skeleton. Then, both
players have UFM strategies based on memory skeleton M in all games G = (A,⊑) if and only if ⊑ and ⊑−1
are M-monotone and M-selective.
We state this theorem broadly and with a focus on UFM strategies. The actual results we have for each
direction of the equivalence — which we develop in Section 4 and Section 5 — are a bit stronger, of wider
applicability and/or more interesting, but this statement carries the take-home message of our work. It
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is also meant to mirror the seminal result of Gimbert and Zielonka [25, Theorem 2]: their result can be
retrieved from Theorem 16 by taking the trivial memory skeleton with only one state, which can be written
asMtriv = (M = {minit},minit, αupd : {minit} ×C → {minit}). As such, our work brings a strict generalization
of Gimbert and Zielonka’s results [25] to the finite-memory case.
Remark 17. Recall Remark 8: in the following sections, we will break down Theorem 16 into different results
that are always stated using the weakest hypotheses and granting the strongest conclusions. For example,
we can actually guarantee Nash equilibria, not only optimal strategies (Theorem 22 and Corollary 24).
Similarly, we study the two implications of the equivalence in a compositional way: we split the reasoning for
M-monotony and M-selectivity, using different skeletons for each whenever meaningful, as well as for the
players, again when beneficial. Additionally, we distinguish between arenas where the players do not need
memory and the ones where they do, the first essentially being arenas that already share the good properties
of product arenas (as in “product with a memory skeleton”).
While such a level of care is not necessary to obtain Theorem 16, it has two advantages. First, from a
practical standpoint, it permits to obtain more useful results when focusing on a particular direction of the
equivalence (as often the case in applications). Second, from a theoretical standpoint, it permits to isolate
each concept and each element of the reasoning and to highlight their true roles in the underlying mechanisms
that lead to the existence of UFM strategies. ⊳
To prove Theorem 16, we invoke the results we will prove in Section 4 and Section 5.
Proof (Theorem 16). The left-to-right implication trivially follows from Theorem 19 (forM-monotony) and
Theorem 20 (for M-selectivity), applied to each player with respect to his preference relation. The converse
implication is established in Corollary 24, which can be restated in terms of UFM strategies through Lemma 7.
⊓⊔
Lifting corollary. As discussed in Section 1, the work of Gimbert and Zielonka contains not one, but two
great results. Alongside the aforementioned equivalence result, Gimbert and Zielonka provide a corollary of
utmost practical interest [25, Corollary 7]: they essentially obtain as a by-product of their approach that if
memoryless strategies suffice in all one-player games of P1 and all one-player games of P2, they also suffice
in all two-player games.
This provides an elegant way to prove that a preference relation (or equivalently an objective) admits
memoryless optimal strategies without proving monotony and selectivity at all : proving it in the two one-
player subcases, which is generally much easier as it boils down to graph reasoning, and then lifting the
result to the general two-player case through the corollary.
Again, we are able to lift this corollary to the finite-memory case, as follows.
Corollary 18. Let ⊑ be a preference relation and M1,M2 be two memory skeletons. Assume that
1. for all one-player arenas A = (S1, S2 = ∅, E), P1 has a UFM strategy σ1 ∈ ΣFM1 (A) based on memory
skeleton M1 in G = (A,⊑);
2. for all one-player arenas A = (S1 = ∅, S2, E), P2 has a UFM strategy σ2 ∈ ΣFM2 (A) based on memory
skeleton M2 in G = (A,⊑).
Then, for all two-player arenas A = (S1, S2, E), both P1 and P2 have UFM strategies σi ∈ ΣFMi (A) based on
memory skeleton M =M1 ⊗M2 in G = (A,⊑).
We highlight the two (possibly different) skeletons of the two players to maintain a compositional ap-
proach, but if the same skeleton M works in both one-player versions, it also suffices in the two-player
version.
Proof. By Theorem 19 and Theorem 20 — which essentially state that the left-to-right implication of Theo-
rem 16 holds already in one-player games, the hypothesis yields that ⊑ is M1-monotone and M1-selective,
while ⊑−1 is M2-monotone and M2-selective. Now it suffices to apply Corollary 24 — essentially the right-
to-left implication of Theorem 16 — to get the claim. ⊓⊔
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Fig. 2. Memory skeletons Mp (left) and Mc (right) for two-target reachability games.
3.3 Example of application
We present an illustrative application of our results, thereby proving the existence of UFM strategies for a
specific preference relation: the conjunction of two reachability objectives, a subcase of generalized reachability
games, studied extensively in [20]. Let C be an arbitrary set of colors, and T1, T2 ⊆ C be two target sets
of colors that have to be reached at least once. Formally, let the winning condition W ⊆ Cω be the set of
infinite words w = c1c2 . . . such that
∃ i, j ∈ N, ci ∈ T1 ∧ cj ∈ T2.
This winning condition induces a preference relation ⊑ as discussed in Example 3. We exhibit two memory
skeletonsMp = (Mp,mpinit, α
p
upd) andM
c = (M c,mcinit, α
c
upd) such that ⊑ isM
p-monotone andMc-selective:
they are pictured in Figure 2. Note that such skeletons are obviously not unique.
Let us prove that ⊑ is Mp-monotone. Let m ∈Mp, K1,K2 ∈ R(C); we want to show that Equation (7)
is satisfied. We assume that there exists w ∈ Lmp
init
,m such that [wK1] ⊏ [wK2]: this means that all words
of [wK1] are losing, and that there exists a winning word in [wK2]. Let w
′ ∈ Lmp
init
,m; we show that we
necessarily have that [w′K1] ⊑ [w′K2]. Note that if [K1] is empty, this always holds; we now assume that
[K1] is non-empty. We study the two possible values of m separately.
– If m = mpinit, then w and w
′ do not reach T1. If w does not reach T2 either, as there is a winning word
in [wK2], then there must be a winning word in [K2]. This word is still winning after prepending w
′ to
it, so there is a winning word in [w′K2], and [w
′K1] ⊑ [w
′K2]. If w reaches T2, then [K1] cannot have a
word reaching T1. As w
′ does not reach T1 either, all words of [w
′K1] are losing, so [w
′K1] ⊑ [w′K2].
– If m = mp2, then w and w
′ reach T1. Clearly, w cannot reach T2 (as [wK1] would be winning). This
implies that [K2] must contain a word reaching T2; as w
′ reaches T1, the concatenation of w
′ with the
word of [K2] reaching T2 means that there is a winning word in [w
′K2], so [w
′K1] ⊑ [w′K2].
Let us now prove that ⊑ is Mc-selective. Let w ∈ C∗, m = α̂cupd(m
c
init, w), K1,K2 ∈ R(C) such that
K1,K2 ⊆ Lm,m, and K3 ∈ R(C). We show that Equation (8) is satisfied, i.e., that
[w(K1 ∪K2)
∗K3] ⊑ [wK
∗
1 ] ∪ [wK
∗
2 ] ∪ [wK3].
If all words of [w(K1∪K2)∗K3] are losing, this equation trivially holds; we thus assume that this set contains
a winning word. We therefore have to show that there is a winning word in [wK∗1 ], [wK
∗
2 ], or [wK3]. We
study the three possible values of m separately.
– If m = mcinit, then w does not reach T1 nor T2, and the same holds for all words of K1 and K2, as
K1,K2 ⊆ Lmc
init
,mc
init
. Therefore, if a word of [w(K1 ∪K2)∗K3] is winning, this must be because a word of
[wK3] is winning.
– If m = mc2, then w reaches T2 but not T1, and K1,K2 do not reach T1. Thus, a word of [K3] must reach
T1; in particular, a word of [wK3] must reach both T1 and T2.
– Ifm = mc3, we distinguish two cases. If w reaches T2 and T1, then [wK
∗
1 ]∪[wK
∗
2 ]∪[wK3] trivially contains
only winning words. If w reaches T1 but not T2, then there must be a word reaching T2 in [(K1∪K2)∗K3].
Hence, at least one set among [K∗1 ], [K
∗
2 ], and [K3] must contain a word reaching T2, so [wK
∗
1 ], [wK
∗
2 ],
or [wK3] contains a winning word.
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Fig. 3. Arena A (left), memory skeleton M (center; with minit = m1), and their product arena A ⋉M (right; only
states reachable from S × {minit} are depicted). We assume that T1 = {t1}, T2 = {t2}. The (S × {minit})-optimal
memoryless strategy is highlighted with bold arrows.
Similar arguments can be laid out to show that the preference relation ⊑−1 of P2 is Mp-monotone
and Mtriv-selective (where Mtriv is the trivial memory skeleton with only one state defined earlier). Let
M =Mp ⊗Mc ⊗Mtriv be the product of all the considered skeletons. Although M formally has six states,
only three of them are reachable, and it is similar to skeleton Mc. By Lemma 13, we have that both ⊑ and
⊑−1 areM-monotone andM-selective. Using Theorem 16, we obtain that both players have UFM strategies
based on skeletonM in all games G = (A,⊑). Note that memory skeletonM is minimal (no memory skeleton
with two states or less suffices for P1 to play optimally in all arenas [20]).
We provide an example of a one-player arena A = (S1, S2 = ∅, E) in Figure 3, and show that there is a
UFM strategy for the preference relation ⊑ based on skeleton M. To do so, we invoke Lemma 4: we show
equivalently that the product A ⋉M admits an (S × {minit})-optimal memoryless strategy for ⊑. Notice
that no memoryless strategy suffices to play optimally in G = (A,⊑), as when starting in s2, P1 should first
visit s1 before going to s3. Also, the (S×{minit})-optimal memoryless strategy for the product arena is only
optimal if the initial state is in S × {minit}; it is for instance not optimal from state (s2,m2).
In this example, we used Theorem 16 directly in order to provide one thorough illustration of the defini-
tions of M-monotony and M-selectivity. However, in practice, using Corollary 18 is preferable, as it yields
a much shorter proof. By exhibiting the right skeletons for P1 and P2, we would simply have to show that
these skeletons are sufficient to play optimally on both players’ one-player arenas, which amounts to graph
reasoning.
4 From finite memory based on M to M-monotony and M-selectivity
Monotony. We want to keep our approach as compositional as possible, hence we consider the two notions
separately. Let us start with M-monotony.
Theorem 19. Let M = (M,minit, αupd) be a memory skeleton and ⊑ be a preference relation. Assume that
for all one-player arenas A = (S1, S2 = ∅, E), for all s, s′ ∈ S, P1 has an s-optimal and s′-optimal strategy
σ ∈ ΣFM1 (A), encoded as a Mealy machine Γσ = (M, αnxt), in G = (A,⊑). Then ⊑ is M-monotone.
Note that the same holds for P2 and ⊑
−1 symmetrically. As discussed in Section 3, we always go for the
weakest hypotheses whenever possible to obtain the most general results: in this case, we do not require full
uniformity of the strategy, but only uniformity with regard to the fixed pair of states (i.e., strategy σ does
not need to be optimal from other states).
Our proof can be sketched as follows. We need to establish that Equation (7) holds. We first instantiate
the four languages involved in it: {w}, {w′}, K1 and K2. We take NFAs recognizing them and build an NFA
N that joins them in such a way that, when N is considered as a game arena (see Lemma 2), its plays
correspond exactly to the languages of infinite words considered in Equation (7). This arena is essentially
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Nw \ {qwfin} Nw
′
\ {qw
′
fin }
NK1 \ {qK1init } N
K2 \ {qK2init }
t
Fig. 4. Automaton N built to establish M-monotony.
composed of two chains emulating the two prefixes w and w′ and leading to a state t where P1 has to pick a
side corresponding to the two languages [K1] and [K2] (Figure 4). Now, establishing the M-monotony of ⊑
boils down to invoking an optimal strategy σ in the corresponding game, the crux being that this strategy
always picks the same edge in t (i.e., the same side between subarenas corresponding to [K1] and [K2]) as
both prefixes w and w′ are deemed equivalent by the memory skeleton M.
Proof. LetM = (M,minit, αupd) be a memory skeleton and ⊑ be a preference relation satisfying the hypoth-
esis. Let us prove that ⊑ is M-monotone, i.e., that for all m ∈M , for all K1,K2 ∈ R(C),
∃w ∈ Lminit,m, [wK1] ⊏ [wK2] =⇒ ∀w
′ ∈ Lminit,m, [w
′K1] ⊑ [w
′K2]. (11)
Let m ∈M , K1,K2 ∈ R(C). We assume that K1,K2 6= ∅, otherwise Equation (11) holds trivially: if K1
is empty, the conclusion of the implication is true regardless of K2; and if K2 is empty, the premise is false.
Now, assume there exists w ∈ Lminit,m such that [wK1] ⊏ [wK2], and let w
′ be another prefix in Lminit,m. We
will prove that [w′K1] ⊑ [w′K2].
Let Nw = (Qw, Bw, δw, qwinit, Q
w
fin), N
w′ = (Qw
′
, Bw
′
, δw
′
, qw
′
init, Q
w′
fin ), N
K1 = (QK1 , BK1 , δK1 , qK1init , Q
K1
fin )
and NK2 = (QK2 , BK2 , δK2 , qK2init , Q
K2
fin ) respectively denote NFAs recognizing languages {w}, {w
′}, K1 and
K2. They exist since all these languages are regular. We assume w.l.o.g. that automaton Nw (resp. Nw
′
,
NK1 , NK2) is coaccessible and has only one initial state qwinit (resp. q
w′
init, q
K1
init , q
K2
init ) with no ingoing transition.
We can do this since K1 and K2 are non-empty. We also assume w.l.o.g. that N
w (resp. Nw
′
) has only
one final state qwfin (resp. q
w′
fin ) with no outgoing transition. Actually, N
w and Nw
′
can be taken as “chains”
recognizing a unique word, and being coaccessible and deterministic.
We build an automaton N = (Q,B, δ,Qinit, Qfin) by “merging” states q
K1
init , q
K2
init , q
w
fin, and q
w′
fin . We call this
new merged state t. Formally, we built it as follows.
– Q = (Qw ∪Qw
′
∪QK1 ∪QK2 ∪ {t}) \ {qK1init , q
K2
init , q
w
fin, q
w′
fin };
– B = Bw ∪Bw
′
∪BK1 ∪BK2 ;
– Qinit = {q
w
init, q
w′
init} and Qfin = Q
K1
fin ∪Q
K2
fin ;
– and finally, the transition relation simply takes into account the merging on t:
δ =
{
(q, c, q′) | (q, c, q′) ∈ (δw ∪ δw
′
∪ δK1 ∪ δK2) ∧ q, q′ 6∈ {qK1init , q
K2
init , q
w
fin, q
w′
fin }
}
∪
{
(q, c, t) | (q, c, q′) ∈ (δw ∪ δw
′
) ∧ q′ ∈ {qwfin, q
w′
fin }
}
∪
{
(t, c, q′) | (q, c, q′) ∈ (δK1 ∪ δK2) ∧ q ∈ {qK1init , q
K2
init}
}
.
This construction is illustrated in Figure 4. The language recognized by N from qwinit is w(K1 ∪K2), whereas
from qw
′
init, it is w
′(K1 ∪K2). Observe that N is coaccessible since both NK1 and NK2 are coaccessible.
Recall that we assume [wK1] ⊏ [wK2]. By definition, this implies that [wK2] 6= ∅, hence we also have
that [K2] 6= ∅. From this, we get that t is essential in N (Lemma 2). Thus, it is also the case of qwinit and q
w′
init.
We will now interpret this NFA as an arena and use the hypothesis. Let A = Arena(N ). By Lemma 2,
we have that ĉol(Plays(A, qwinit)) = [w(K1 ∪K2)] and ĉol(Plays(A, q
w′
init)) = [w
′(K1 ∪K2)]. By hypothesis, P1
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has a qwinit-optimal and q
w′
init-optimal strategy σ ∈ Σ
FM
1 (A), encoded as a Mealy machine Γσ = (M, αnxt), in
G = (A,⊑).
Let pi ∈ Plays(A, qwinit, σ) be the only play consistent with strategy σ from q
w
init. By definition of A, this
play pi necessarily contains a history ρ = e1 . . . en such that out(en) = t and for all i, 1 ≤ i < n, out(ei) 6= t.
Observe that ĉol(ρ) = w. Recall that m = α̂upd(minit, w) is the memory state reached after reading w since
w ∈ Lminit,m. Let e = αnxt(m, t) be the edge chosen by σ in t when t is visited (note that t will be visited
only once by construction of A).
We will show that e belongs to the part generated by NK2 . By contradiction, assume it belongs to NK1 .
Then, pi = ρ · pi′, with ĉol(pi′) ∈ [K1], hence ĉol(pi) ∈ [wK1]. First, observe that
[wK2] ⊑ ĉol(Plays(A, q
w
init))
since [wK2] ⊆ [wK1]∪[wK2], [wK1]∪[wK2] = [w(K1 ∪K2)] by Lemma 1, and, as noted above, [w(K1 ∪K2)] =
ĉol(Plays(A, qwinit)). Now since σ is optimal
4 from qwinit, we have
[wK2] ⊑ ĉol(pi).
Finally, we assumed that ĉol(pi) ∈ [wK1], hence we can conclude that
[wK2] ⊑ [wK1],
which contradicts the hypothesis that [wK1] ⊏ [wK2]. Hence, we have established that e belongs to NK2 .
Now let us consider pi′′ ∈ Plays(A, qw
′
init, σ), the only play consistent with strategy σ from q
w′
init. Again, by
definition of A, this play pi′′ necessarily contains a history ρ′′ = e1 . . . en such that out(en) = t and for all i,
1 ≤ i < n, out(ei) 6= t. Observe that ĉol(ρ′′) = w′. Since w′ ∈ Lminit,m, we also have that α̂upd(minit, w
′) = m,
i.e., the memory state reached after reading w′ is the same as the one reached after reading w. Recall that
αnxt is deterministic by definition: i.e., for a given memory state and state of the arena, it always prescribes
the same edge. Hence, we have that e = αnxt(m, t) is exactly the same as before, and therefore belongs to
NK2 . Thus, ĉol(pi′′) ∈ [w′K2].
Finally, since σ is also qw
′
init-optimal and applying the same reasoning as above, we have that
[w′K1] ⊑ [w
′K1] ∪ [w
′K2] = [w
′(K1 ∪K2)] = ĉol(Plays(A, q
w′
init))
⊑ ĉol(pi′′)
⊑ [w′K2],
which proves Equation (11) and concludes our proof. ⊓⊔
Selectivity. We now turn to selectivity, which focuses on stability with regard to cycle mixing.
Theorem 20. Let M = (M,minit, αupd) be a memory skeleton and ⊑ be a preference relation. Assume that
for all one-player arenas A = (S1, S2 = ∅, E), for all s ∈ S, P1 has an s-optimal strategy σ ∈ ΣFM1 (A),
encoded as a Mealy machine Γσ = (M, αnxt), in G = (A,⊑). Then ⊑ is M-selective.
Note that the same holds for P2 and ⊑
−1 symmetrically. Again, observe that our hypothesis is as weak as
possible as no uniformity is required.
Our proof bears similarities with the monotone case. We need to establish that Equation (8) holds. We
first instantiate the four languages involved in it: {w}, K1, K2 and K3. We take NFAs recognizing them and
build an NFA N that joins them in such a way that, when N is considered as a game arena (see Lemma 2),
its plays correspond exactly to the languages of infinite words considered in Equation (8). This arena is
4 One can easily get from the definition using the UCol-operator that, in this one-player game, σ is qwinit-optimal if
and only if for all σ′ ∈ Σ(A), ĉol(Plays(A, qwinit, σ
′)) ⊑ ĉol(Plays(A, qwinit, σ)).
19
essentially composed of a chain emulating the prefix w and leading to a state t where P1 can visit sides that
generate cycles from K1 and K2 — forever or for a finite time — or branch to a side corresponding to K3
(Figure 5). Now, establishing the M-selectivity of ⊑ boils down to invoking an optimal strategy σ in the
corresponding game, the crux being that this strategy always picks the same edge in t (i.e., side between
subarenas corresponding to [K∗1 ], [K
∗
2 ] and [K3]) as all cycles on t are deemed equivalent by the memory
skeletonM. The main difference with the previous construction is transparent in the last sentence: it is now
possible to come back to t, possibly infinitely often, and our proof takes that into account.
Proof. LetM = (M,minit, αupd) be a memory skeleton and ⊑ a preference relation satisfying the hypothesis.
Let us prove that ⊑ is M-selective, i.e., that for all w ∈ C∗, m = α̂upd(minit, w), for all K1,K2 ∈ R(C) such
that K1,K2 ⊆ Lm,m, for all K3 ∈ R(C),
[w(K1 ∪K2)
∗K3] ⊑ [wK
∗
1 ] ∪ [wK
∗
2 ] ∪ [wK3]. (12)
Let w ∈ C∗ and m = α̂upd(minit, w). Let K1,K2,K3 ∈ R(C), with K1,K2 ⊆ Lm,m. In the following, we
assume all three languages K1, K2 and K3 to be non-empty. Indeed, if K3 is empty, so is the left-hand side of
Equation (12), hence it trivially holds. If both K1 and K2 are empty, Equation (12) compares [wK3] to itself,
hence it trivially holds again. Finally, if K1 is the only empty language among the three, then Equation (12)
can be restated as follows:
[w(K1 ∪K2)
∗K3] = [w(K2 ∪K2)
∗K3] ⊑ [wK
∗
2 ] ∪ [wK
∗
2 ] ∪ [wK3] = [wK
∗
1 ] ∪ [wK
∗
2 ] ∪ [wK3],
where the middle inequality — the one to prove — involves three non-empty sets. A symmetric argument
holds if K2 is the only empty language. We also assume that K1 and K2 do not contain the empty word for
technical convenience: this is w.l.o.g. thanks to the Kleene stars used in the regular expressions to consider.
As for monotony, we start by considering NFAs for all these languages: let Nw = (Qw, Bw, δw, qwinit, Q
w
fin),
NK1 = (QK1 , BK1 , δK1 , qK1init , Q
K1
fin ),N
K2 = (QK2 , BK2 , δK2 , qK2init , Q
K2
fin ) andN
K3 = (QK3 , BK3 , δK3 , qK3init , Q
K3
fin )
respectively denote NFAs recognizing languages {w}, K1, K2 and K3. They exist since all these languages
are regular. We assume w.l.o.g. that automaton Nw (resp. NK1 , NK2 , NK3) is coaccessible and has only
one initial state qwinit (resp. q
K1
init , q
K2
init , q
K3
init ) with no ingoing transition. We can do this since K1, K2 and K3
are non-empty. We also assume w.l.o.g. that Nw (resp. NK1 , NK2) has only one final state qwfin (resp. q
K1
fin ,
qK2fin ) with no outgoing transition. Again N
w can simply be a “chain” recognizing a unique word, being both
coaccessible and deterministic.
Similarly to Theorem 19, we build an automaton N = (Q,B, δ,Qinit, Qfin) by “merging” states q
K1
init , q
K2
init ,
qK3init , q
w
fin, q
K1
fin , and q
K2
fin . We call this new merged state t. Formally, we build it as follows.
– Q = (Qw ∪QK1 ∪QK2 ∪QK3 ∪ {t}) \ {qK1init , q
K2
init , q
K3
init , q
w
fin, q
K1
fin , q
K2
fin };
– B = Bw ∪BK1 ∪BK2 ∪BK3 ;
– Qinit = Q
w
init = {q
w
init} and Qfin = Q
K3
fin ;
– and finally, the transition relation simply takes into account the merging on t:
δ =
{
(q, c, q′) | (q, c, q′) ∈ (δw ∪ δK1 ∪ δK2 ∪ δK3) ∧ q, q′ 6∈ {qK1init , q
K2
init , q
K3
init , q
w
fin, q
K1
fin , q
K2
fin }
}
∪
{
(q, c, t) | (q, c, q′) ∈ (δw ∪ δK1 ∪ δK2) ∧ q′ ∈ {qwfin, q
K1
fin , q
K2
fin }
}
∪
{
(t, c, q′) | (q, c, q′) ∈ (δK1 ∪ δK2 ∪ δK3) ∧ q ∈ {qK1init , q
K2
init , q
K3
init}
}
.
This construction is illustrated in Figure 5. The language recognized by N is w(K1 ∪K2)∗K3. Observe that
N is coaccessible since NK1 , NK2 and NK3 are coaccessible. Also observe that t is essential by construction:
by merging the initial and final states of K1 (resp. K2), we created cycles on t. Thus, q
w
init is also essential.
We will now interpret this NFA as an arena and use the hypothesis. Let A = Arena(N ). By Lemma 2, we
have that ĉol(Plays(A, qwinit)) = [w(K1 ∪K2)
∗K3]. By hypothesis, P1 has a qwinit-optimal strategy σ ∈ Σ
FM
1 (A),
encoded as a Mealy machine Γσ = (M, αnxt), in G = (A,⊑).
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Nw \ {qwfin}
t
NK1 \ {qK1init , q
K1
fin } N
K2 \ {qK2init , q
K2
fin }
NK3 \ {qK3init }
Fig. 5. Automaton N built to establish M-selectivity.
Let pi ∈ Plays(A, qwinit, σ) be the only play consistent with strategy σ from q
w
init. By q
w
init-optimality, we have
that
[w(K1 ∪K2)
∗K3] ⊑ ĉol(pi). (13)
By definition of A, this play pi necessarily contains a history ρ = e1 . . . en such that out(en) = t and for
all i, 1 ≤ i < n, out(ei) 6= t. Observe that ĉol(ρ) = w. Recall that m = α̂upd(minit, w) is the memory state
reached after reading w since w ∈ Lminit,m. Let e = αnxt(m, t) be the edge chosen by σ in t when t is first
visited. Note that in contrast to the construction in Theorem 19, t could be visited many times here, and
even infinitely often (using cycles from K1 and K2). We consider two cases in the following.
First, assume that e belongs to the part of the arena generated by NK3 . Since t (originally qK3init ) has
no incoming transition in NK3 , we conclude that pi never visits t again, and that ĉol(pi) ∈ [wK3]. By
Equation (13), we verify Equation (12).
Now, assume that e belongs to the part of the arena generated by NK1 (the same reasoning will apply
symmetrically for NK2). We want to show that ĉol(pi) ∈ [wK∗1 ], i.e., that σ never switches to another part
of the arena. Two cases are possible: either (a) pi visits t only once, or (b) pi visits t at least twice.
Case (a). Since pi visits t only once and t is the only state where the play could switch to a different
automaton, we have that pi = ρ · pi′ for a suffix pi′ starting in t and entirely contained in NK1 . Hence, we
have ĉol(pi) = w · ĉol(pi′) with ĉol(pi′) ∈ [K1]. Thus, ĉol(pi) ∈ [wK1] ⊆ [wK∗1 ].
Case (b). Let pi = ρ · ρ′ · pi′, such that ρ′ ends with the second visit of t. Recall that w = ĉol(ρ),
m = α̂upd(minit, w), and e = αnxt(m, t). Now, by definition of K1, we have that ĉol(ρ
′) ∈ Lm,m. Hence,
α̂upd(m, ĉol(ρ
′)) = m. Intuitively, the memory skeleton is back to the same memory state after reading the
cycle ρ′. As argued in Theorem 19, αnxt is deterministic, and both the state of the arena and the memory
state are identical after ρ and after ρ · ρ′. Therefore σ(ρ · ρ′) = σ(ρ) = e. Iterating this reasoning (as all
cycles on t in NK1 are read as cycles on m in the memory), we conclude that pi = ρ · (ρ′)ω . This implies that
ĉol(pi) ∈ [wK∗1 ].
Hence, in both cases, we have that ĉol(pi) ∈ [wK∗1 ]. Now, by Equation (13), we verify Equation (12).
Wrapping everything up, we have that whatever the part of the arena to which e belongs, Equation (12)
is verified. Therefore, we have shown that ⊑ is indeed M-selective. ⊓⊔
Wrap-up. Through Theorem 19 and Theorem 20, we have established that the existence of finite-memory
optimal strategies based on a skeletonM in one-player games implies bothM-monotony andM-selectivity
of the preference relation, under very mild uniformity assumption. It is interesting to observe that this holds
already for one-player games (a fortiori, for two-player games too). In the next section, we consider the
converse: we will prove that M-monotony and M-selectivity implies the existence of finite-memory optimal
strategies, not only in one-player games, but even in two-player ones.
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5 From M-monotony and M-selectivity to finite memory based on M
Induction step. To prove the coveted implication (Theorem 22), we first focus on memoryless strategies
in “covered” arenas, as discussed in Section 2. Intuitively, a “covered” arena is akin to a product arena
(with a memory skeleton): hence studying memoryless strategies on such arenas is very close to studying
finite-memory strategies on general arenas.
We will proceed by induction on the number of choices in an arena, as sketched in Section 2. This
induction will require us to mix different Nash equilibria (one for each player) in a proper way, to maintain
the desired property. For the sake of readability, we thus start by proving the induction step for one player.
For an arena A = (S1, S2, E), we write nA = |E| − |S| for its number of choices.
Lemma 21. Let ⊑ be a preference relation and Mp, Mc be two memory skeletons. Assume that ⊑ is Mp-
monotone and Mc-selective. Let n ∈ N. Assume that for all arenas A′ = (S′1, S
′
2, E
′) such that nA′ < n,
for all subsets of states S′cov ⊆ S
′ for which Mp is a prefix-cover and Mc is a cyclic-cover, there exists a
memoryless Nash equilibrium (σ′1, σ
′
2) ∈ Σ
ML
1 (A
′)×ΣML2 (A
′) from S′cov in G
′ = (A′,⊑).
Then, for all arenas A = (S1, S2, E) such that nA = n, for all subset of states Scov ⊆ S for which Mp
is a prefix-cover and Mc is a cyclic-cover, there exists a Nash equilibrium (σ1, σ2) ∈ ΣML1 (A) ×Σ2(A) from
Scov in G = (A,⊑) such that σ1 is memoryless.
Note that the same holds for P2 and ⊑
−1 symmetrically.
Intuitively, Lemma 21 states that under the hypotheses of Mp-monotony and Mc-selectivity, if both
players can play optimally with memoryless strategies in “small” and “covered” arenas, the same property
holds for at least P1 in “covered” arenas where an additional choice exists.
This lemma has to be commented. First, observe that the property is about Nash equilibria. Indeed,
as explained in Section 2, the result we prove is actually slightly stronger than the existence of optimal
strategies, as it can be stated for Nash equilibria.
Second, this lemma is focused on proving the existence of an NE in which P1’s strategy is memoryless:
proving that this holds for both players will be done in Theorem 22.
Third, as motivated in Section 2, we state our result as the existence of memoryless optimal strategies in
“covered” arenas: the existence of UFM strategies in general arenas will follow (Corollary 24), but taking this
road allows us to keep optimal strategies memoryless for many arenas (which already share the “classifying”
properties that a product with a memory skeleton would grant).
Fourth, we use two different skeletons, one for monotony (i.e., dealing with prefixes) and one for selectivity
(i.e., dealing with cycles). Obviously, one can use a single combined skeleton using Lemma 13 and Lemma 15,
but our approach has the advantage of being compositional and highlighting how each skeleton / property
impacts the reasoning in the proof: we will see that they have very different uses.
Lastly, the notions of prefix-covers and cyclic-covers are defined with regard to a covered set of states
Scov in order to keep the need for uniformity minimal, in the same spirit as what we did in Section 4.
As mentioned above, our proof is essentially an induction step. Starting from an arena A with nA = n
choices, we identify a state t in which P1 has at least two choices (the proof is symmetric for P2). By splitting
the edges in t in two sets, we obtain two corresponding subarenas Aa and Ab such that nAa , nAb < n, along
with the corresponding subgames. The induction hypothesis gives us two memoryless Nash equilibria (from
Scov) in these subgames: (σ
a
1 , σ
a
2 ) and (σ
b
1, σ
b
2). The arguments can then be unfolded intuitively as follows.
First, using Mp-monotony and Mp being a prefix-cover, we identify one subarena (say Aa) which is clearly
at least as good as the other for P1. Second, we build a strategy profile (σ
#
1 , σ
#
2 ), that we claim to be an
NE in G, in the following way: P1 uses strategy σa1 (the one from the best subarena) and P2 reacts to P1’s
actions by playing the corresponding best-response strategy. I.e., if P1 plays in Aa, P2 plays according to σa2 ,
and otherwise he plays according to σb2. Third, it remains to prove the two inequalities of Equation (4). The
rightmost one is easy, as well as the leftmost one in the subcase where the unique play pi ∈ Plays(A, s, σ#1 , σ
#
2 )
does not visit state t: they can both be proved essentially thanks to the induction hypothesis and easy
construction arguments. The crux of the proof is thus in the last step: proving that the leftmost inequality
holds when the play visits t. This can be achieved thanks to Mc-selectivity and Mc being a cyclic-cover,
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Lemma 1, inherent properties of the preference relation, Aa being the best subarena thanks Mp-monotony,
and the induction hypothesis, in that order.
Obviously, M-monotony (Definition 11), M-selectivity (Definition 12), prefix-covers and cyclic-covers
(Definition 14) were defined to be sufficient to provide Lemma 21: one of the main challenges was to have
them not too powerful as to keep them also necessary, as proved in Section 4.
Proof. Let Mp = (Mp,mpinit, α
p
upd) and M
c = (M c,mcinit, α
c
upd). Let ⊑ be a preference relation that is M
p-
monotone and Mc-selective. Let n ∈ N and assume that for all arenas A′ = (S′1, S
′
2, E
′) such that nA′ < n,
for all subsets of states S′cov ⊆ S
′ for which Mp is a prefix-cover and Mc is a cyclic-cover, there exists a
memoryless Nash equilibrium (σ′1, σ
′
2) ∈ Σ
ML
1 (A
′)×ΣML2 (A
′) in G′ = (A′,⊑).
Now, let A = (S1, S2, E) be an arena such that nA = n, and let Scov ⊆ S be a subset of states
for which Mp is a prefix-cover and Mc is a cyclic-cover. Our goal is to prove that there exists an NE
(σ1, σ2) ∈ ΣML1 (A)×Σ2(A) from Scov in G = (A,⊑) such that σ1 is memoryless. The same proof can be done
with respect to P2 symmetrically, using its preference relation ⊑−1 and the appropriate skeletons.
If A is such that P1 has no choice (i.e., all his states have only one outgoing edge), the proof is trivial.
Hence, let us assume this is not the case and let t ∈ S1 be a state with at least two edges, i.e., |{e ∈ E |
in(e) = t}| > 1. We partition {e ∈ E | in(e) = t} in two (non-empty) sets Ea and Eb, and we define two
corresponding subarenas, Aa = (S1, S2, E \ Eb), and Ab = (S1, S2, E \ Ea). Observe that it remains true
that Mp is a prefix-cover and Mc is a cyclic-cover of Scov, both in Aa and Ab, by definition of prefix- and
cyclic-covers (intuitively, we quantify universally over fewer histories than in A).
Thus, by induction hypothesis (since nAa , nAb < nA = n), we have memoryless NE from Scov in the
subgames Ga = (Aa,⊑) and Gb = (Ab,⊑). Let us denote them by (σ
j
1, σ
j
2) for game Gj , j ∈ {a, b}.
Since Mp is a prefix-cover of Scov in A, there exists m
p
t ∈ M
p such that, for all ρ ∈ Hists(A) such that
in(ρ) ∈ Scov and out(ρ) = t, α̂upd(m
p
init, ĉol(ρ)) = m
p
t . Now, let K
p
j = ĉol
(
Hists(Aj , t, σ
j
2)
)
, for j ∈ {a, b}, that
is, Kpj contains all (projections to colors of) histories consistent with σ
j
2 and starting in t in subarena Aj .
By Mp-monotony, we can easily deduce that we have
∀w ∈ Lp
m
p
init
,m
p
t
, [wKpa] ⊑ [wK
p
b ],
or ∀w ∈ Lp
m
p
init
,m
p
t
, [wKpb ] ⊑ [wK
p
a] (14)
where Lp
m
p
init
,m
p
t
stands for the usual language of sequences of colors read from mpinit to m
p
t , the additional
superscript being used to highlight that we are considering skeleton Mp here. From now on, we assume
w.l.o.g. that (14) holds, i.e., that ∀w ∈ Lp
m
p
init
,m
p
t
, [wKpb ] ⊑ [wK
p
a ]. Intuitively, this means that, for P1,
committing to the subarena Aa is always at least as good as committing to the subarena Ab. Note that
this does not imply anything with regard to alternating between the two subarenas, which could a priori be
beneficial: we will deal with that soon thanks to Mc-selectivity.
Let us define the strategy σ#1 ∈ Σ
ML
1 (A) of P1 in the game G = (A,⊑) as σ
#
1 = σ
a
1 , the strategy used in
the NE from Scov in the subgame Ga (we chose this one because of assumption (14): Ga is the better subgame
of the two for P1). Strategy σ
#
1 is thus memoryless by definition. Note that σ
#
1 is well-defined on A even
though the original strategy was on Aa, since it is memoryless (i.e., whether the prefix did visit Ab or not
does not matter). Now we define a corresponding strategy σ#2 ∈ Σ2(A) for P2 in G that uses a small amount
of memory, as follows:
∀ ρ ∈ Hists2(A), σ
#
2 (ρ) =


σa2 (ρ) if ρ never visited t,
σa2 (ρ) if the last visit of t was followed by an edge in Aa,
σb2(ρ) otherwise.
Again this strategy is well-defined on A. Our goal is to show that the strategy profile (σ#1 , σ
#
2 ) is an NE
from all states in Scov in the larger game G. In particular, Lemma 7 implies that this profile is a couple of
Scov-optimal strategies.
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Formally, we will establish that for all s ∈ Scov, for all σ1 ∈ Σ1(A), for all σ2 ∈ Σ2(A), we have
ĉol(Plays(A, s, σ1, σ
#
2 )) ⊑ ĉol(Plays(A, s, σ
#
1 , σ
#
2 )) ⊑ ĉol(Plays(A, s, σ
#
1 , σ2)). (15)
We begin with the rightmost inequality of Equation (15). Let s ∈ Scov and let σ2 ∈ Σ2(A) be an arbitrary
strategy for P2 in G. We denote by σ2[Aa] its restriction to (histories of) Aa: note that this strategy is well-
defined as only edges belonging to P1 have been removed in Aa.
We have
ĉol(Plays(A, s, σ#1 , σ
#
2 )) = ĉol(Plays(Aa, s, σ
a
1 , σ
a
2 )) because these strategies stay in Aa,
⊑ ĉol(Plays(Aa, s, σ
a
1 , σ2[Aa])) because (σ
a
1 , σ
a
2 ) is an NE from s in Aa,
= ĉol(Plays(A, s, σ#1 , σ2)) because these strategies stay in Aa,
hence the rightmost inequality is verified.
Now, consider the leftmost inequality of Equation (15). Let s ∈ Scov and let σ1 ∈ Σ1(A) be an arbitrary
strategy for P1 in G. Let pi ∈ Plays(A, s, σ1, σ
#
2 ) be the only play consistent with σ1 and σ
#
2 from s. We first
consider the case where pi never visits t. If this is the case, then pi is also a play in Aa. Let σ′1 ∈ Σ1(Aa) be a
strategy of P1 that mimics σ1 on all histories that belong to Aa, except the ones ending in t, where it plays
an arbitrary edge in Ea. We have
ĉol(pi) = ĉol(Plays(A, s, σ1, σ
#
2 )) = ĉol(Plays(Aa, s, σ
′
1, σ
a
2 )) because pi stays in Aa and never visits t,
⊑ ĉol(Plays(Aa, s, σ
a
1 , σ
a
2 )) because (σ
a
1 , σ
a
2 ) is an NE from s in Aa,
= ĉol(Plays(A, s, σ#1 , σ
#
2 )) because these strategies stay in Aa,
hence the leftmost inequality is verified in the case where pi never visits t.
It remains to consider the case where pi does visit t. Observe that for the moment, we have not used
Mc-selectivity and the fact that s ∈ Scov: they will be crucial to solve this (more complex) case.
We define Kcj = ĉol
(
{ρ ∈ Hists(Aj , t, σ
j
2) | out(ρ) = t}
)
, for j ∈ {a, b}, that is, Kcj contains all (projections
to colors of) cycles on t consistent with σj2 (i.e., the strategy from the subgame NE) in subarena Aj . Since
the unique play pi ∈ Plays(A, s, σ1, σ
#
2 ) visits t at least once, we write pi = ρ · pi
′ for ρ, the prefix ending with
the first visit of t. Let w = ĉol(ρ). Observe that
ĉol(pi) ∈ [w(Kca ∪K
c
b)
∗(Kpa ∪K
p
b )]
since σ#2 alternates between σ
a
2 and σ
b
2 depending on what P1 plays in t. Intuitively, either pi cycles infinitely
often on t using cycles of (Kca∪K
c
b), or it does it for a while, then switches to (K
p
a ∪K
p
b ), which induces that
pi commits to a subarena. Thus, we trivially have ĉol(pi) ⊑ [w(Kca ∪K
c
b)
∗(Kpa ∪K
p
b )].
Since Mc is a cyclic-cover of Scov in A, and ρ starts in Scov, we know that for mc = α̂cupd(m
c
init, ĉol(ρ)),
and for all ρ′ ∈ Hists(A) such that in(ρ′) = out(ρ′) = t, we have α̂cupd(m
c, ĉol(ρ′)) = mc. That is, all cycles
on t are read as cycles on mc in Mc. This implies that Kca,K
c
b ⊆ Lmc,mc . Knowing that, we can invoke the
Mc-selectivity (Equation (8)) of the preference relation to obtain
ĉol(pi) ⊑ [w(Kca)
∗] ∪ [w(Kcb)
∗] ∪ [w(Kpa ∪K
p
b )].
Using Lemma 1, we have
ĉol(pi) ⊑ [w(Kca)
∗] ∪ [w(Kcb)
∗] ∪ [wKpa] ∪ [wK
p
b ].
Observe that [w(Kcj )
∗] ⊆ [wKpj ], for j ∈ {a, b}. Hence, we have
ĉol(pi) ⊑ [wKpa] ∪ [wK
p
b ].
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Now, recall that using the Mp-monotony of ⊑, we assumed that ∀w ∈ Lp
m
p
init
,m
p
t
, [wKpb ] ⊑ [wK
p
a]. Since ρ
starts in Scov andMp is a prefix-cover of Scov, this inequality is in particular true for w = ĉol(ρ). Hence, we
have
ĉol(pi) ⊑ [wKpa].
Now, recall that (σa1 , σ
a
2 ) is an NE from Scov in Ga. Recall also that w represents the history up to the first
visit of t consistent with (σ1, σ
#
2 ); it is also consistent with (σ1, σ
a
2 ) since σ
#
2 follows σ
a
2 up to the first visit
of t. Hence, we also have
[wKpa] ⊆ ĉol(Plays(Aa, s, σ
a
2 )) ⊑ ĉol(Plays(Aa, s, σ
a
1 , σ
a
2 )).
Therefore,
ĉol(pi) ⊑ ĉol(Plays(Aa, s, σ
a
1 , σ
a
2 ))
= ĉol(Plays(A, s, σ#1 , σ
#
2 )) because these strategies stay in Aa.
Recalling that pi is the only play in Plays(A, s, σ1, σ
#
2 ), we are done with proving the leftmost inequality of
Equation (15).
Summing up our arguments, we have established that the couple of strategies (σ#1 , σ
#
2 ) is indeed a Nash
equilibrium in G from Scov. Note that this in particular implies, via Lemma 7, that σ
#
1 is an Scov-optimal
memoryless strategy in G. ⊓⊔
Memoryless Nash equilibria. We are now armed to establish the implication sketched earlier. As moti-
vated before, we first state the result in the context of memoryless NE on “covered” arenas, the finite-memory
case on general arenas will follow almost trivially.
Theorem 22. Let ⊑ be a preference relation andMp1,M
p
2,M
c
1 andM
c
2 be four memory skeletons. Assume
that ⊑ is Mp1-monotone and M
c
1-selective, and that ⊑
−1 is Mp2-monotone and M
c
2-selective. Then, for all
arenas A = (S1, S2, E), for all subsets of states Scov ⊆ S for which M
p
1 and M
p
2 are prefix-covers, and M
c
1
and Mc2 are cyclic-covers, there exists a memoryless Nash equilibrium (σ1, σ2) ∈ Σ
ML
1 (A) × Σ
ML
2 (A) from
Scov in G = (A,⊑).
As always, we want to keep our results as general and compositional as possible, hence we consider
different skeletons for the two players. As argued before, one can always take a single skeleton for the two
players, as well as for the two notions, by taking their product and using Lemma 13 and Lemma 15.
As discussed previously, this theorem in particular implies the existence of memoryless Scov-optimal
strategies for both players (via Lemma 7).
It is fairly straightforward to prove Theorem 22 once Lemma 21 is established: the main idea is to invoke
Lemma 21 for both players while doing the induction, and obtain two Nash equilibria, both of which being
memoryless for only one-player. Then, to conclude, we resort to Lemma 5 which gives us the possibility to
mix these two NE into one that is now memoryless for both players.
Remark 23. Recall that a crucial hypothesis for Lemma 5 to hold is that our games are antagonistic, i.e.,
that we consider ⊑ and its inverse relation ⊑−1. It is quite interesting to observe that our use of Lemma 5
is the only circumstance in which this hypothesis matters (and it is indeed of utmost importance) in all
our reasoning.5 In other words, most of our arguments would hold for two different preference relations,
⊑1 and ⊑2, without the hypothesis that ⊑2 equals (⊑1)−1. The problem would be that we cannot mix the
5 To be more precise: we wrote everything in the antagonistic setting, but Equation (4) can be written as two
inequalities in the general setting — ĉol(Plays(A, s, σ′1, σ2)) ⊑1 ĉol(Plays(A, s, σ1, σ2)) and ĉol(Plays(A, s, σ1, σ
′
2)) ⊑2
ĉol(Plays(A, s, σ1, σ2)) — and all our previous reasoning can be rewritten accordingly.
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two equilibria in a single equilibrium with both strategies being memoryless — while we do need it in the
hypothesis of the induction step Lemma 21.
Whether the same reasoning can be extended to (general) Nash equilibria by adapting Lemma 21 to take
into account the unavoidable blow-up of memory is a question we leave open for future work. Note that
the memory bounds would be awful in any case: as the induction would unroll, the memory needed in the
equilibria would build up (essentially one bit of memory is added at each call of the induction step in our
easier setting, which is then discarded thanks to Lemma 21). ⊳
Proof. Let ⊑ be a preference relation and Mp1, M
p
2, M
c
1 and M
c
2 be four memory skeletons such that ⊑ is
Mp1-monotone and M
c
1-selective, and ⊑
−1 is Mp2-monotone and M
c
2-selective.
We will proceed by induction on the number of choices in the arena, as described before. The base case,
nA = 0, is trivial. Now let n ∈ N \ {0} and assume the result holds for nA < n. Let A = (S1, S2, E) be an
arena such that nA = n, and let Scov ⊆ S be a subset of states for whichM
p
1 andM
p
2 are prefix-covers, and
Mc1 and M
c
2 are cyclic-covers.
Focusing on P1 and ⊑, we invoke Lemma 21 (using M
p
1 and M
c
1, and the induction hypothesis) and
obtain an NE (σ♠1 , σ
♠
2 ) ∈ Σ
ML
1 (A) × Σ2(A) from Scov in G = (A,⊑). Note that this NE is only memoryless
for P1! Symmetrically, focusing on P2 and ⊑
−1, we invoke Lemma 21 (usingMp2 andM
c
2, and the induction
hypothesis) and obtain an NE (σ♣1 , σ
♣
2 ) ∈ Σ1(A) × Σ
ML
2 (A) from Scov in G = (A,⊑). Again, note that this
NE is only memoryless for P2.
To conclude, it suffices to use Lemma 5: (σ♠1 , σ
♠
2 ) can be mixed with (σ
♣
1 , σ
♣
2 ) into an equivalent NE
(σ♠1 , σ
♣
2 ) ∈ Σ
ML
1 (A)×Σ
ML
2 (A), which is now memoryless for both players. This concludes our induction step
and our proof. ⊓⊔
Finite-memory Nash equilibria and UFM strategies. Finally, we conclude this section by establishing
our long-sought result as a corollary.
Corollary 24. Let ⊑ be a preference relation andMp1,M
p
2,M
c
1 andM
c
2 be four memory skeletons. Assume
that ⊑ is Mp1-monotone and M
c
1-selective, and that ⊑
−1 is Mp2-monotone and M
c
2-selective. Then, for all
arenas A = (S1, S2, E), there exists a uniform finite-memory Nash equilibrium (σ1, σ2) ∈ ΣFM1 (A)×Σ
FM
2 (A)
in G = (A,⊑), such that strategies σi are encoded as Mealy machines Γσi = (M, α
i
nxt) based on the joint
memory skeleton M =Mp1 ⊗M
p
2 ⊗M
c
1 ⊗M
c
2.
As usual in this section, we state our result for the slightly stronger notion of Nash equilibria: it involves
in particular the existence of UFM strategies for both players. As for Theorem 22, we use four memory
skeletons to keep the approach compositional and player-based, and we provide strategies based on their
product memory. However, if there exists a skeleton M that is already such that both ⊑ and ⊑−1 are M-
monotone andM-selective, this skeleton suffices to build both strategies (this is transparent in the following
proof).
This corollary is fairly easy to obtain. We build the joint memory skeleton M as defined above. By
Lemma 13 and Lemma 15, we can invoke Theorem 22 on the product arena A⋉M and obtain a memoryless
NE on it, or equivalently, a finite-memory one on the original arena, through Lemma 4.
Proof. Let ⊑ be a preference relation and let Mp1,M
p
2, M
c
1 and M
c
2 be four memory skeletons such that ⊑
is Mp1-monotone and M
c
1-selective, and that ⊑
−1 is Mp2-monotone and M
c
2-selective. Let A = (S1, S2, E)
be an arena.
We define M = (M,minit, αupd) =M
p
1 ⊗M
p
2 ⊗M
c
1 ⊗M
c
2, the joint memory skeleton. By Lemma 13, ⊑
and ⊑−1 are both M-monotone and M-selective.
Consider the product arena A′ = A⋉M, as defined in Section 2. Recall that S′ = S×M . By Lemma 15,
the set of states S′cov = S × {minit} ⊆ S
′ is both prefix-covered and cyclic-covered by M.
Putting the last two arguments together, we may invoke Theorem 22 on A′ and obtain a memoryless
Nash equilibrium (σ′1, σ
′
2) ∈ Σ
ML
1 (A
′)×ΣML2 (A
′) from S′cov in G
′ = (A′,⊑).
To conclude, it suffices to use Lemma 4 (stated using NE, as discussed in Remark 10): the memoryless
equilibrium (σ′1, σ
′
2) in the product game G
′ can be seen as a finite-memory equilibrium (σ1, σ2) ∈ ΣFM1 (A)×
ΣFM2 (A) in G = (A,⊑), where strategies σi are encoded as Mealy machines Γσi = (M, α
i
nxt). ⊓⊔
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6 Discussion
We close our paper with a discussion of the assets and limits of our approach, its applicability with regard
to the current research landscape, and the directions we aim to follow in future work.
Technical features of our approach. As observed through Remark 8 and Remark 17, our results are
established using the weakest assumptions and granting the strongest conclusions, whenever possible. They
also preserve compositionality, splitting the reasoning for M-monotony and M-selectivity, and for the two
players. As pointed out in Remark 17, this methodology yields stronger results and helps in highlighting the
precise role of each concept in the mechanism leading to the existence of UFM strategies.
AlongsideM-monotony andM-selectivity, we define two other key concepts to solve the technical issues
related to the induction on product arenas: prefix-covers and cyclic-covers. These notions are crucial tools
to prove the results in Section 5.
Some advantages. The aforementioned concepts of prefix-covers and cyclic-covers also have benefits from
a practical point of view: given a preference relation ⊑ and the corresponding memory skeletonM, they let
us identify game arenas where memoryless strategies suffice whereas finite memory (based on M) might be
necessary in general. Such arenas are the ones covered by M. Hence in practice, this approach permits to
obtain UML strategies for many arenas where a coarser approach would only provide UFM ones.
Our approach yields two methods to establish that a preference relation (or equivalently a payoff function
or a winning condition) admits UFM strategies. The first one, exhibiting appropriate memory skeletons and
proving M-monotony and M-selectivity, is based on Theorem 16 and can be used compositionally through
Corollary 24. The second one follows the lifting corollary, Corollary 18: one only has to study the one-player
subcases then invoke this result to lift the existence of UFM strategies to the two-player case, without
checking for M-monotony and M-selectivity at all. Hence this second method is often painless in practice.
Two interesting facts can be seen through Corollary 18. First, there is no blow-up in the memory required
when going from one-player games to two-player games: the overall memory simply combines the memory
skeletons of the two players. Second, assuming that one has an algorithm to solve6 one-player games — say for
P1 — for a winning condition satisfying our hypotheses, this lifting corollary also induces a naive algorithm
for the two-player case for free: thanks to the bounds on memory, one may enumerate the strategies of the
adversary, P2 — or guess one if one aims for a non-deterministic algorithm — and solve the corresponding
P1’s game(s) where the strategy of P2 is fixed. Note that while such a simple algorithm might not be optimal,
it does correspond to the approach giving the best complexity class known for the renowned family of games
in NP ∩ coNP, such as, e.g., parity or mean-payoff games (e.g., [28]).
Applicability. Let us give a quick tour of some classical (combinations of) objectives — expressed through
winning conditions, payoffs or preference relations — and assess whether our approach permits to establish
the existence of UFM strategies in the corresponding games.
Note that when considering multiple (quantitative) objectives, optimal strategies usually do not exist,
and one has to settle for Pareto-optimal ones (e.g., [17]). However, in many cases, the (decision) problem
under study is as follows: given a threshold (vector), define the winning condition as all the plays achieving
at least this threshold, and check for a winning strategy. Hence multi-objective quantitative games are often
de facto reduced to qualitative win-lose games for this so-called threshold problem. Observe that, given a
multi-objective setting, if UFM strategies exist for all threshold problems, then finite-memory strategies
suffice to realize the Pareto front (as each point of this front can be considered as a threshold). Therefore,
our approach also enables reasoning about the existence of finite-memory Pareto-optimal strategies in multi-
objective games.
We start our overview with some game settings that fall under the scope of our approach. Obviously, all
memoryless-determined objectives are among them, since we generalize Gimbert and Zielonka’s work [25]:
this includes, e.g., mean-payoff [18], parity [19,39], energy [11] or average-energy games [5]. As established in
Section 1, our results encompass all cases where arena-independent memory suffices. Hence they permit to
rediscover the existence of UFM strategies for games such as, e.g., generalized reachability [20], generalized
6 I.e., decide who has a winning strategy from a given state.
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parity [15], window parity games [9], or lower- and upper-bounded (multi-dimension) energy games [3,5,4].
Our approach can also be useful to extend these known results to more general combinations, either via
appropriate memory skeletons or through the lifting corollary (see an application in Section 3.3).
There are many games that do not fit our approach for good reasons, as they do not admit UFM strategies
in general: e.g., multi-dimension mean-payoff [38], mean-payoff parity [14], or energy mean-payoff games [10].
More interesting are games for which UFM strategies exist, but the memory is arena-dependent. These
notably include games with multi-dimension lower-bounded energy objectives and no upper bound [16,29],
or window mean-payoff games [13]. In such games, the players usually have to keep track of information such
as, e.g., the sum of weights along an acyclic path, which is bounded for any given arena, but by a value that
grows when the arena grows. Hence the need for memory that grows with the arena parameters. Our results
cannot be applied directly to such cases in order to obtain the existence of UFM strategies for all games.
An adaptation of our approach could potentially be used for subclasses of arenas where the parameters are
bounded (in order to regain a skeleton working on all arenas of the class).
Comparison with related work. We already discussed extensively the most important related arti-
cles [24,25,30,1,31,37] in Section 1, alongside a technical comparison between our work and Gimbert and
Zielonka’s seminal result [25]. Here, we simply want to highlight interesting directions of research inspired by
some of these papers. First, Aminof and Rubin provide a simpler (but incomplete) approach to memoryless de-
terminacy through the prism of first-cycle games in [1]: a similar take on finite-memory determinacy could be
appealing — it could provide sufficient conditions easier to test thanM-monotony andM-selectivity. Second,
Kopczynski establishes sufficient (and relaxed) conditions to ensure the existence of UML strategies for one
player in [30]: it would be interesting to study the corresponding problem in the finite-memory case. Indeed,
in many games where infinite memory is needed, it is only the case for one of the players (e.g., [38,14,10])
and conditions a` la Kopczynski could thus prove useful. Finally, recall that Le Roux et al. give a rather
tight characterization of combinations of objectives preserving the sufficiency of finite-memory strategies
in [37]. Their techniques, as well as the scope of their results, is somewhat orthogonal to ours. Whether both
approaches can be intertwined to obtain results on more general settings remains an open question.
Limits and future work. To close this paper, we recall two limits of our approach, and the corresponding
open problems.
First, as explained throughout the paper, our results cover all cases where arena-independent memory
suffices, and are limited to these cases. We have argued that the approach cannot be fully lifted to the general
case, for good reasons, as the lifting corollary breaks in some situations (Section 1). Still, we have hope to
generalize our approach to some extent to the arena-dependent case, through some function associating
memory skeletons to arenas, as discussed in Section 1. Obtaining a lifting corollary — under well-chosen
conditions — in the arena-dependent case would be of tremendous help in practice: see for example [5,4,10].
Hence this is clearly the next step in our quest.
Second, as explained in Remark 6 and Remark 23, most of our arguments carry over to the case of
general Nash equilibria. That is, when considering not necessarily antagonistic games where the two players
use different, not necessarily inverse, preference relations. Whether our approach can be adapted in this case,
at the price of an unavoidable blow-up of memory, is an open question worth considering. In particular, we
want to study the links between our results (including the lifting from one-player to two-player games) and
recent results lifting finite-memory determinacy from two-player to multi-player games [36].
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A Counterexample to a general lifting corollary
We discuss in full details the counterexample presented in Section 1. Let C = Z. We consider the following
two winning conditions:
W1 = {c1c2 . . . ∈ C
ω | lim inf
n→∞
n∑
i=1
ci = +∞},
W2 = {c1c2 . . . ∈ C
ω |
n∑
i=1
ci = 0 for infinitely many n’s}.
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If the play obtained by playing a game is pi, P1 wins if and only if ĉol(pi) lies inW =W1∪W2, and P2 wins if
and only if ĉol(pi) lies in W = Cω \W =W1 ∩W2 (which corresponds to the description given in Section 1).
We prove that P1 and P2 have finite-memory optimal strategies in their respective one-player games.
Let us fix some terminology beforehand: we say that a cycle in an arena is a zero cycle if the sum of
its weights is zero, a positive cycle if this sum is strictly positive, and a negative cycle if this sum is strictly
negative.
We first consider P1’s one-player games. In a one-player arena, P1 can create a play pi such that ĉol(pi) ∈
W1 if and only if there is a reachable positive cycle. In this case, P1 can win with a memoryless strategy
(simply reaching the cycle and then looping in it). If that is not possible, in order to win, P1 has to induce
a play pi such that ĉol(pi) ∈ W2. We show that if possible, this can be done using finite memory. Let us
assume that there exists a play pi = e1e2 . . . such that ĉol(pi) = c1c2 . . . ∈ W2. Let us consider two indices
k, l ∈ N such that k < l, ek = el,
∑k
i=1 ci = 0, and
∑l
i=1 ci = 0. Such two indices necessarily exist, as there
are finitely many edges in the arena, but infinitely many indices for which the running sum of weights is 0.
Notice in particular that
∑l
i=k+1 ci = 0. Now, consider the play
pi′ = e1 . . . ekek+1 . . . elek+1 . . . elek+1 . . . ,
with the sequence of edges ek+1 . . . el repeating ad infinitum (pi
′ is a “lasso”). This is a valid play since
ek = el. Moreover, we have that ĉol(pi
′) ∈ W2 as after repeating m times the sequence ek+1 . . . el, the sum
of the weights equals
∑k
i=1 ci +m ·
∑l
i=k+1 ci = 0 +m · 0 = 0. The play pi
′ can be implemented with finite
memory, as it consists of a finite prefix and a repeated finite sequence, which corresponds to a zero cycle.
We now turn our attention to P2’s one-player games; P2 wins a play pi such that ĉol(pi) = c1c2 . . . ∈ C
ω
if and only if
lim inf
n→∞
n∑
i=1
ci < +∞∧
n∑
i=1
ci = 0 for at most finitely many n’s.
In a one-player arena, if there is a reachable negative cycle, P2 can ensure to win by pumping it forever,
and can therefore win with a memoryless strategy. We now consider an arena that has no reachable negative
cycle. As we did for P1, we show that if P2 can win a game in such an arena, then he can do so using finite
memory. If P2 can win, let pi = e1e2 . . . be a winning play for P2, i.e., ĉol(pi) = c1c2 . . . ∈ W1 ∩W2. Let s be
a state visited infinitely often when pi is played, and m ∈ N be the first index such that out(em) = s. We can
decompose pi into a finite prefix e1 . . . em followed by an infinite sequence of cycles, all starting in s. Since
there is no negative cycle, we cannot have that infinitely many of these cycles are positive, as this would
imply that ĉol(pi) ∈ W1. Thus, infinitely many zero cycles are taken from s. As ĉol(pi) ∈ W2, there exists
such a cycle ek . . . el (that is, in(ek) = out(el) = s and
∑l
i=k ci = 0) such that for all k ≤ n ≤ l, it holds that∑n
i=1 ci 6= 0. This also implies that
∑k−1
i=1 ci 6= 0, i.e., the history up to this cycle has a non-zero sum. Now,
let us consider the play
pi′ = e1 . . . ek−1ek . . . elek . . . elek . . . ,
with the sequence of edges ek . . . el repeating ad infinitum (pi
′ is a “lasso”). This is a valid play as in(ek) =
out(el). As
∑l
i=k ci = 0, we have that ĉol(pi
′) ∈W1. Moreover, every time the cycle starts again, the running
sum of weights is equal to the same value:
∑k−1
i=1 ci 6= 0. Therefore, as the running sum of weights does not
reach zero the first time the cycle is taken, and it also never reaches zero along the cycle, it can never reach
zero after index k − 1. Hence, ĉol(pi′) is not in W2 either, and pi′ is winning for P2. For the same reason as
for P1, play pi′ only requires finite memory to be implemented.
As argued in Section 1, the two-player game from Figure 1 illustrates that P1 might need infinite memory
to play optimally in the two-player case. This proves that Gimbert and Zielonka’s approach cannot work
in full generality in the finite-memory case, as we cannot obtain the existence of finite-memory optimal
strategies in all two-player games from the existence of finite-memory optimal strategies in all one-player
games.
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